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Summary 
 
Problem statement 
Power and dependence are important concepts for understanding buyer-supplier relationships and 
strongly influence the nature of the relationship. In asymmetric relationships, the most independent 
partner tends to dominate the exchange. Attempts to forge partnership relationships often fail due 
to a lack of understanding of the power positions of the parties involved. The development and 
control of inter-organizational relationships are regarded as key to accomplishing strategic supply-
chain management objectives. Firms often belong to supply networks that cut across industry 
boundaries as buyers and suppliers may operate in various industries and be part of different supply 
chains. The smallest unit of a network is called a triad and can be described as a subset of three 
actors and the (possible) tie(s) among them and, as the smallest form of a network, it allows to study 
network behavior. Buyers may want to find a coalition partner in the same tier or linked tiers to gain 
leverage. Knowledge of coalition dynamics on the triadic level is fundamental for understanding the 
dynamics of larger networks. In the past, there have been several studies on power imbalance. Few 
studies consider the role of a weaker player in buyer–supplier relationships. The aim of this study is 
to research the process of coalition building on a triadic level from the perspective of the weaker 
buyer. The problem statement of this study is: 
 
 “How are coalitions built in buyer-supplier networks from the perspective of a weaker buyer on a 
triadic level?” 
 
Research method 
Little is known on the process of coalition building. In a case study from the perspective of the 
Materieel Logistiek Commando (MATLOGCO) which is part of the Royal Netherlands Ministry of 
Defence (NLD MoD) as the buyer, the process of coalition building on the triadic level from the 
perspective of a weaker buyer is researched. Because of this scarcity of knowledge and the dynamic 
cluster of variables that influence each other reciprocally, using a case study approach is considered 
appropriate to discover a rich and new understanding of the process of coalition building in triads. 
Data is collected by using semi structured interviews with selected actors within the MATLOGCO as a 
buyer and KMW and VHSP providing capacities and services. Criteria for selecting actors for the semi 
structured interviews were based on level of authority, contribution in the triad, strategic 
positioning, level of power dominance, etcetera. By differentiation in collecting techniques and the 
selection of respondents, triangulation is enabled.  
 
Results 
On behalf of MATLOGCO, VHSP was introduced in the dyadic relation between MATLOGCO and 
KMW. Introducing VHSP into the relation has several benefits for especially MATLOGCO as the 
weaker buyer. Most important, the level of knowledge could increase and the availability of 
operational systems would increase as well. The binding element within the triad between KMW-
VHSP-MATLOGCO is knowledge. The exchange of information between KMW and VHSP as the 
suppliers will lead to a better performance of the systems and is directly beneficial to NLD MoD. 
Secondly, by increasing the level of knowledge MATLOGCO can become a mature partner. As the 
user of the ground based systems, developed and produced by KMW, they will be able to support 
VHSP and KMW, which is beneficial for optimizing existing systems and for the development of 
future systems. The awareness of MATLOGCO being the weaker buyer and the importance for VHSP 
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to acquire knowledge resulted in an intensified exchange of knowledge between MATLOGCO and 
VHSP and as a first result the Taskforce MRO Power Pack was formed.  
  
KMW and VHSP shift in roles from buyer, supplier or partner, between both organizations and in 
their network as well. There is a need to maintain open and unambiguous relations, resulting in full 
exchange of information with limited control. Another interesting result is found in the power 
domination. Although KMW is the dominant organization within the triad it does not coerce its 
power. KMW is in certain cases a monopolistic player and therefore MATLOGCO cannot leave KMW 
as a supplier. On the other hand, the mutual interdependence is high, coercing power might 
influence the relations for future projects. The systems have been in use for many years which 
implies long-lasting relationships. Harmonious relationships between members are beneficial to all 
organizations. An interesting result was the voluntary dependence of MATLOGCO on KMW. In some 
cases, they are able to execute the contracts without KMW, but they prefer being serviced by KMW. 
 
Recommendations for practice 
The findings presented several opportunities for practice. First, this research contributes to the 
defence-industry in general. The branch is characterized by a limited number of organizations and a 
high degree of integration. Like the NLD MoD the Western defence organizations have the same 
mutual interdependence to the civil supplier. Especially most of the European NATO-partners are in 
the same position as the NLD MoD.  This study might contribute to these organizations as well and 
enable them to optimize their process to improve the military operations of their MoD in total. 
Secondly, this study contributes directly to the performance of MATLOGCO and VHSP. The results 
suggest that knowledge is the binding element. MATLOGCO wants to invest in becoming a “smart 
maintainer” and “smart buyer”. If MATLOGCO wants to be a mature partner to its suppliers it is 
necessary to increase the level of knowledge. By increasing the level of knowledge their position 
towards KMW as the dominant organization in the triad will  change in the benefit of MATLOGCO and 
VHSP and will make the businessrelation more efficient and effective. For MATLOGCO and VHSP this 
study can be used as confirmation to extend the started integration between both organizations.  
 
Recommendations for further research 
There are two important limitations of this research which would prompt additional research. First, 
there is the risk of bias during the interviews and in analyzing the outcomes of the interviews. The 
researcher is well experienced within the NLD MoD, although not in this specific branch. Additional 
research could contribute to the validity by using an experienced individual within the branch as the 
researcher on this topic. The second limitation refers to the sample of respondents. The respondents 
received the generally formulated interview questions in advance. The preparation time and the 
generalizability of the questions could not prevent personal opinions and personal assumptions as an 
outcome of the interviews. Despite a constant focus of the researcher on avoiding personal prejudice 
by the respondents there is still a possibility for bias within the used data. 
 
Furthermore, the results lead to recommendations for additional research. First, the specific 
characteristics of the branch might have influenced the results of the research. By keeping multiple 
case studies within triads in different branches might lead to varying results. Secondly, the dominant 
player was primarily monopolistic and more common suppliers could be sought out. Finally, 
MATLOGCO is a non-profit organization and has no primary focus on profit. Additional research from 
the focus of a profit-organization might lead to compelling results. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Problem statement 
 
Power and interdependence are generally considered to be important concepts for understanding 
buyer-supplier relationships (e.g. Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007). Buchanan (1992) conceptualized 
power-dependence imbalances in buyer-supplier relationships as the difference in value that buyers 
and sellers attach to the relationship. In asymmetric relationships, the most independent partner 
dominates the exchange. Buyer supplier relationships that are characterized by asymmetric 
interdependence are believed to be deficient because the independent partner experiences high 
power and might be attempted to exploit it (Anderson & Weitz, 1989; Geyskens, Steenkamp, Sheer, 
& Kumar, 1996; Frazier & Rody, 1991). McDonald (1999) states in this respect that power imbalances 
within a buyer-supplier relationship can lead to unproductive partnerships. However, power 
asymmetry could also be used as a tool to promote supply chain integration and to induce high levels 
of performance (Maloni & Benton, 2000). Power can provide an effective coordination of exchange 
relationships, as the distribution of power has become legitimate over time (Frazier & Antia, 1995).  
 
Power asymmetry between actors is one of the defining characteristics of any supply network (Cox, 
1999, 2001; Harland, Lamming, Jurong, & Johnsen, 2001). In the past, there have been several 
studies on power imbalance. They researchd the role of trust and power (Benton and Maloni,2005), 
the role of bargaining power (Crook and Combs, 2007), relationship commitment and power (Zhao  et 
al., 2008) and how a buying company exerts power to influence the relationship between suppliers 
(Wu et al., 2010). Those studies mainly focused on the powerful actors that control and influence 
behaviors and exchanges in buyer-supplier relationships. Few studies consider the role of a weaker 
player in buyer–supplier relationships (e.g., Christiansen & Maltz, 2002; Ramsay & Wagner, 2009).  
 
Power and dependence strongly influence the nature of the buyer supplier relationship (Van Weele 
and Rozemeijer, 1999). In their opinion attempts to forge partnership relationships often fail due to a 
lack of understanding of the power positions of the parties involved. The development and control of 
inter-organizational relationships are regarded as key to accomplishing strategic supply-chain 
management objectives (Hoyt and Huq, 2000; Croom and Watt, 2000; Macpherson and Wilson, 
2003; Quayle, 2003). Firms often belong to supply networks that cut across industry boundaries  as 
buyers and suppliers may operate in various industries and be part of different supply chains. 
Political, legal, economic, social and technological forces at work in these industries represent a 
dynamic cluster of variables that influence each other reciprocally, affecting actors and supply chains 
embedded in different networks (Theodorakopoulos, 2012). Li & Choi (2009), suggests that managers  
lack knowledge on how to manage interfirm relationships beyond the dyadic approach. 
 
Bast et al (2013) were the first to discuss power and the role of a weaker player in a triadic context. A 
triad is the smallest unit of a network. Wasserman & Faust (1994) define a triad as “a subset of three 
actors and the (possible) tie(s) among them” It is the triad that captures the basic essence of a 
network and allows us to study the behavior of a network (Choi et al., 2009). In a triad, a node will 
affect a node (e.g. A affecting B or C) and a link affects a link (e.g. AB affecting AC or BC). Dyads show 
how a node affects another node, but it is not able to address how a link may affect another link. 
Bastl et al (2013) recommend that buyers should look for a coalition partner in the same tie r or 
linked tiers. Two firms might form a coalition to gain leverage over the buying firm. Gamson (1961) 
defines a coalition as a temporary, means-oriented alliance among players with different goals. In 
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addition, a coalition has a short-term focus and can take place between two competing players 
(Caplow, 1959). The relationship through coalition entails an informal and non-contractual 
relationship. If existing power differences is known among players in a triad it would be possible to 
predict subsequent coalition outcomes. 
 
Bastl et al. (2013) contributed to the body of knowledge on relational dynamics by focusing on the 
role of a weaker actor in a triadic context. They concluded that the knowledge of coalition dynamics 
on the triadic level is fundamental to understand the level of larger networks. Although this study has 
important theoretical arguments and practical implications there are still many unanswered 
questions. A promising avenue for further research is to research the process through which 
coalitions are being formed. 
  
The aim of this study is to research the process of coalition building on a triadic level from the 
perspective of the weaker buyer. The problem statement of this study is: 
 
 “How are coalitions built in buyer-supplier networks from the perspective of a weaker buyer on a 
triadic level?” 
 
This study attempts to make three contributions. First, this research will augment the knowledge of 
buyer-supplier relationships on a triadic level. Most research has been done on the dyadic level (e.g. 
Bastl et al. (2013). The primary focus will be on the process of coalition building. Secondly, little is 
known of the perspective of a weaker actor (Cox,2001; Zhao et al. 2008). The majority of research 
has been done from the perspective of a powerful actor. Third, this study intends to contribute to 
our understanding of the role of the weaker player in buyer supplier relationships in the 
interorganizational context.   
 
 
1.2 Research method 
 
In a case study, there is intensive focus on a single phenomenon within its real-life context. The 
method is not troubled by the fact that the context contains innumerable variables (Yin, 1999). 
Therefore, the technical definition of case studies is:   
 
“Case studies are research situations where the number of variables of interest far outstrips the 
number of data points” (Yin, 2013). 
 
Case studies tolerate the condition whereby the boundary between a phenomenon and its context is 
not clear. The method has sufficient flexibility to cope with this uncertainty, which is an important 
feature of qualitative research more generally (Sofaer, 1999).  
 
The chosen research design is a single case study. Little is known on the process of coalition building 
on the triadic level. Because of this scarcity of knowledge and the dynamic cluster of variables that 
influence each other reciprocally, affecting actors and supply chains embedded in different networks 
(Theodorakopoulos, 2012) a case study approach is considered appropriate as it is likely to discove r a 
rich and new understanding of the process of coalition building in triads. The case study will be done 
in the material-logistic branch of the Royal Netherlands Ministry of Defence (NLD MoD).  
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In a case study from the perspective of the Materieel Logistiek Commando (MATLOGCO) of the NLD 
MoD as the buyer, the process of coalition building between relevant actors will be analyzed. The 
context of the innumerable variables is another motivation to use the case study as the chosen 
research design. To constrain these number of variables and actors there will be a primary focus on 
MATLOGCO. Data will be collected by literature research, semi structured interviews with selected 
actors and questionnaires within the NLD MoD as buyer and commercial organizations providing 
capacities and services. Criteria for selecting actors for the semi structured interviews will be based 
on level of authority, contribution in the triad, strategic positioning, level of power dominance., etc. 
By differentiation in collecting techniques and selection of actor triangulation will be reached. 
Shortfall in these interviews is the willingness of the actors to contribute and the impossibility to 
hand over classified information. 
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2 Literature review 
 
 
2.1 Characteristics of Coalitions 
 
Coalitions, have been an interesting field for study by political scientists and social psychologists. The 
concept of "coalition" is used in the organizational literature for at least the past 50 years (March & 
Simon, 1958; Thompson & McEwen, 1958). Although, in the literature on organizational coalitions 
there are a variety of meanings of this term, it is mostly defined as temporary alliances among a 
subset of involved parties (Stevenson et al, 1985). They stated that these varieties of meanings 
concern such fundamental issues as whether the participants are interest groups or individuals, 
whether participants must interact, and whether they must have the same goal for the coalition. 
Gamson (1961) was one of the first to define a coalition. He defines a coalition as a temporary, 
means-oriented alliance among players with different goals. In addition, a coalition has a short-term 
focus and can take place between two competing players (Caplow, 1959).  
 
Organizations and individuals are both social players (King et al. 2010). Describing an individual as a 
player includes: (1) an acknowledgment of the ability to act and (2) an acknowledgment of 
intentionality that guides or justifies action. According to Czarniawska, (1997), in contemporary 
society, organizational actions and human actions (e.g., formation of coalitions) are similar in this 
respect. Sociological scientists have recognized that the behavioral principles of individuals in a social 
group have a strong generalizability (Alessio, 1990; Wolff, 1950; Wuyts et al. 2004). Pfeffer (1992) 
considers coalitions to consist of individuals building and mobilizing support among those who 
already agree on a certain outcome and suggests several important characteristics of such coalitions. 
Although the analysis of coalition formation and coalition behavior in organizations can start with 
ideas from political science, it develops its own theory and empirical base because of the differences 
between organizational contexts and legislative and small-group contexts.  
 
Coalitional theory has been borrowed from the fields of social psychology and political science . Social 
psychologists have tended to focus on the differing amounts of resources that members bring to the 
coalition. By creating experimental conditions in which members have been allocated varying 
amounts of resources, social psychologists have attempted to predict which members would form 
coalitions and how coalitions would divide the payoffs (Stevenson, et al., 1985). The theories of 
coalition formation on which such research is based (Caplow, 1956; Gamson, 1961; Komorita & 
Chertkoff, 1973; Riker, 1962) assume that a given coalition has either a perfect or zero probability of 
winning and that the winnings are known and divisible.  
 
Based on the authors mentioned above Stevenson et al. (1985) define a coalition as: “an interacting 
group of individuals, deliberately constructed, independent of the formal structure, lacking its own 
internal formal structure, consisting of mutually perceived membership, issue oriented, focused on a 
goal or goals external to the coalition, and requiring concerted member action”.  
All eight of these defining characteristics must be present for a group to be considered a coalition  
(Stevenson et al. 1985).  
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2.2  Characteristics of Triads 
 
A supply chain can be defined as a network made up of buyers and suppliers (Choi & Hong 2002). In 
the past scientists focused on the basic relational context within the supply network, namely dyadic 
buyer–supplier relationships (Saeed, Malhotra & Grover 2005) and dyadic supplier–supplier 
relationships (Wu and Choi 2005). In a dyad, the primary focus is on the interaction between two 
firms, but that will not explain the behavior of these firms in a network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994).   
The dependency of one firm on the other is contingent on the availability of the alternative third firm 
(Cook, 1997; Cook et al., 1983; Davis, 1963). Dyads are inadequate in capturing the interactive nature 
inherent in a network. Simmel (1950) took a fundamental theoretical leap by moving the scope of 
inquiry from the dyad to the triad. To cite Simmel (1950); “In the dyad, affection may culminate in 
intimacy but in the three-person group it tends to be either checked or restricted to a subpart” and  
“scapegoating disintegrates the dyad, while it may serve temporarily as a rebuilding expedient in the 
triad”. The attention towards research on triads has extended. This can be attributed to the growing 
academic interest in network research and the suitability of triads to explore how a node affects 
another node and how a link affects another link on the smallest scale (Choi & Wu, 2009a,  b; 
Madhavan, Gnyawali, & He, 2004). Wasserman and Faust (1994) stated a triad as “A subset of three 
actors and the (possible) tie(s) among these players is the smallest form of a network”. To fully 
interpret the relational behavior of a firm, it is necessary to few the triads as the fundamental 
building block of networks (Choi & Wu, 2009a). 
 
A buyer–supplier relationship entails a dyad, which is embedded in a larger network of firms (Choi & 
Wu, 2009a; Harland, 1996; Mentzer, DeWitt, Keebler, Soonhoong, Nancy, Smith, & Zacharia, 2001). 
Every triad contains three players (A, B and C) and three dyadic relationshi ps (AB, AC and BC). In a 
dyad denoted as AB, a weaker player, may choose to create a triad through coalescing with player C 
with which A already has a relationship. Thus, when one of the two players in a dyad establishes a 
coalition with a third player, the arrangement then necessarily becomes a triad. Triads have three 
possible coalition archetypes (Smith & Laage-Hellman, 1992) within coalition formation: 
-One buyer interacting with two suppliers (e.g., Choi, Wu, Ellram, & Koka, 2002; Choi & Wu, 2009a; 
Dubois & Fredriksson, 2008; Madhavan et al. 2004; Wu & Choi, 2005; Wu et al. 2010)  
-One supplier interacting with an intermediary and an end customer (e.g., Li & Choi, 2009; Phillips, 
Liu, & Costello, 1998; Rossetti & Choi, 2005, 2008; van der Valk & van Iwaarden, 2011; Wuyts, 
Stremersch, Van Den Bulte, & Franses, 2004), and;  
-One supplier interacting with two buyers (e.g., Choi & Kim, 2008). 
 
Figure 1 Possible Coalition Archetypes 
 
 
 
Source: Bastl, M., Johnson, M., & Choi, T. Y. (2013). Who's seeking whom? coalition behavior of a 
weaker player in Buyer–Supplier relationships. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 49(1), 8-28.  
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Salo et al. (2009) stated that there are two aspects that will be opened by a triadic view. The first 
aspect is that a triadic view allows us to research different net flows and effects (see e.g. Smith & 
Laage-Hellman, 1992). Caplow (1968) stated it as: “the elucidation of social processes within a triad is 
sufficiently challenging in itself.” Therefore, it is necessary to take the social aspects in coalition 
building in to consideration. As mentioned in paragraph 2.1 organizations and individuals are both 
social players (King et al. 2010). This aspect is especially relevant in the formation of coalitions within 
triads. If we describe an individual as a player this means first the recognition of the ability to act and 
secondly the recognition of the intention that guides or justifies action. Czarniawska, (1997) stated 
that organizational actions and human actions are similar. In the social science scientists have 
discovered that the behavior of individuals in a social group are strongly generalizable (Alessio, 1990; 
Wolff, 1950; Wuyts et al. 2004). To follow Caplow (1956) who stated that “generalizations developed 
in the three-person group will be applicable to situations where the interacting units are organized 
groups, even such very large groups as political parties and states”. 
 
Since Caplow various individual level theories have been used to examine the interactions wi thin 
larger social units (Bastl et al, 2013). Diani and Bison (2004) stated that both individual and organized 
actors, while keeping their autonomy and independence, engage in sustained exchanges of resources 
in pursuit of common goals. The coordination of specific initiatives, the regulation of individual 
actors’ conduct, and the definition of strategies are all dependent on permanent negotiations 
between the individuals and the organizations involved in collective action. An important 
consequence of the role of network dynamics is that more opportunities arise for highly committed 
or skilled individuals to play an independent role in the political process, in contrast to when action is 
concentrated within formal organizations. 
 
Another important aspect of the social process is that a collective identity can occur. Collective 
identity is a process strongly associated with recognition and the creation of connectedness 
(Pizzorno, 1996). It brings a sense of common purpose and shared commitment to a cause, which 
enables individuals and organizations to regard themselves as inextricably linked to other actors, not 
necessarily identical but surely compatible, in a broader collective (Touraine, 1981). This collective 
identity enables actors to establish connections among different occurrences, located at different 
points in time and space, which are relevant to their experience, and that might as well have been 
conceived of as largely independent from each other under different circumstances, and to weave 
them in broader, encompassing narratives (Melucci, 1997). As a result, organizational and individual 
actors involved in collective action no longer merely pursue specific goals, but regard themselves as 
elements of larger and encompassing processes of change or resistance to change (Diani & Bison, 
2004). 
 
In a coalition process conflicts can occur between actors (Diani & Bison, 2004). If a network is purely 
based on a common goal, not backed by strong identity links, conducted mainly through exchanges 
and pooling of resources, the actor will not develop any sense of belonging and of a common future 
during the process. Then, networks are the expression of pure coalitional processes, where actors 
instrumentally share resources to achieve specific goals. Once actors have achieved their aims the 
coalitional process terminates, with no further bonds between the parties involved in it . Next to 
conflict also consensus can take place in the social process. The same considerations as with conflicts 
apply when resources are pooled to pursue specific practical goals, yet without a narrative placing 
the distinct episodes into broader frameworks, and without broader identities developing out of the 
action.  
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Diani and Bison (2004) concluded that social movement process happens to an extent in which long-
term bonds and shared identities translate into sustained networks between independent actors in 
pursuit of shared goals. The purposive, goal-oriented element of collective action, reflected in 
coalition networks, is supported by, and intertwines with, longer term identifications and bonds.  
Failing to recognize the coupling of alliance and identity networks implies blurring the boundaries 
between coalitional and social movement processes. 
 
The second aspect of a triadic view is the opportunity to study coalitions and their formation. Simmel 
(1950) showed that a third player can affect the other two players either positively (keeping the triad 
together) or negatively (disturbing the relationships), which will lead to segregating into a dyad and 
an isolated actor (Caplow, 1968; Simmel, 1950). Simmel suggested “No matter how close a triad may 
be, there is always the occasion on which two of the three players regard the third as an intruder” 
(Wolff, 1950). Furthermore, “It may also be noted how extraordinarily difficult and rare it is for three 
people to attain a really uniform mood” (Wolff, 1950). According to Simmel there is a tendence for a 
triad to become a coalition of “two against one”. The reason in this is that small differences in power 
between the players in a triad have considerable influence on the formation of coalitions (Wolff, 
1950). On these theories Caplow (1956, 1959, 1968) developed his coalition theory. The formation of 
given coalitions depends upon the initial distribution of power in the triad. Furthermore, elements 
being equal may be predicted to some extent when the initial distribution of power is known (Caplow 
1956). Bast et al. (2013) appointed this that coalition outcomes could be predicted if existing power 
differences are known.   
 
Wu and Choi (2005) subsequently appealed for research to consider the more complex buyer–
supplier-supplier engagement to fully understand the relational dynamics of buyer–supplier 
relationships in a supply chain. Choi & Wu (2009a) realized that a buyer–supplier relationship and 
supplier–supplier relationship are two interdependent pieces of the same puzzle. So, the relationship 
between suppliers cannot been considered without regarding the interaction between the buyer and 
each of the suppliers. How suppliers interact with one another would affect the operational 
performance of the buyer (Wu and Choi, 2010). 
 
Operational performance refers to an actual realized competitive strength (Rosenzweig et al., 2003). 
Earlier research indicates positive effects of integration on operational performance (Droge et al., 
2012; Frohlich and Westbrook, 2001; Jacobs et al. 2007; Kulp et al.,2004), in contrast other studies 
either find no significant link or just indicate negative influence (Rodrigue et al., 2004; Swink et al., 
2007; Vereecke & Muylle, 2006). These inconsistencies reflecting different supply integration 
practices or operational performance measures, as well as complementarities across supplier 
integration practices (Alfalla-Luque et al., 2013). There is a direct link between integration intensity 
and improved performance (Frohlich & Westbrook, 2001; Stevens, 1989) suggesting that capabilities 
may serve a partial mediating role (Baron & Kenny, 1986). In a hypercompetitive environment, highly 
integrated organizations are posited to obtain competitive advantage relative to more independent 
firms in two main ways. First, with increased information visibility and operational knowledge. By 
working closely with integrated supply chain partners they can be more responsive to volatile 
demand resulting from frequent changes in competition, technology, regulation, etc. (Dyer, 1996; 
Grant, 1996). Second, firms with highly integrated supply chains have the potential to lower the net 
costs of conducting business and the total delivered costs to customers. With increasing external 
integration, relationships with suppliers and customers become strategic and embody mutual 
support and cooperation, from product design through manufacturing to distribution (Clark,  1996; 
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Frohlich & Westbrook, 2001; Hayes, 2002; Narasimhan & Jayaram, 1998; Parker & Anderson, 2002; 
Wheelwright & Bowen, 1996) 
 
P1: The interaction of suppliers in a triadic relationship affects the operational performance of the 
buyer”. 
 
When we focus on a buyer-supplier and supplier-supplier relations in isolation we see two 
organizations working together. Brought together in a triad different relational dynamics and 
meaning of dyadic engagement start to occur. To build a theory of triadic buyer–supplier–supplier 
relationships, Choi and Wu (2009a) introduced the balance theory in the triadic relationship. Balance 
theory originates from the behavioral psychology and has been developed by scientists focusing on 
relationships among individuals in social groups (Cartwright & Harary 1956; Taylor 1967; Alessio 
1990). Choi and Wu (2009) suggested three reasons for adopting balance theory to examine buyer–
supplier–supplier triads. There are two import reasons for this theory. First, this theory was 
developed by considering mainly the individual level dynamics, management scientists have applied 
it to larger social entities such as groups and organizations (Litwak & Meyer 1966; Gimeno 1999; 
Monge & Contractor 2001; Madhavan, Gnyawali & He 2004; Gimeno & Jeong 2008). Secondly, the 
way balance theory describes a relationship is very similar on who interfirm relationships have been 
captured in the buyer–supplier relationship literature, whether the two nodes have a positive, 
cooperative relationship or a negative, adversarial relationship (MacNeil 1974; Helper 1991; Ellram 
and Edis-Owen 1996). 
 
In the balance theory, there are three balanced and three unbalanced buyer-supplier-supplier 
relationships, finally there are relationships which can be defined as triads with a structural hole.  A 
balanced state offers a stable relational structure for the members in the triad (Osgood & 
Tannenbaum 1955). It signifies a state of equilibrium, where all members of the triad consider the 
overall relationship arrangement as being equitable. An unbalanced state reflects inequity and brings 
instability for organizational actors in the triad (Osgood & Tannenbaum 1955; Festinger 1957; 
Rossetti & Choi 2005). Relational uncertainty posed on the firms in the triad leads to additional 
resources when dealing with these firms. Pressure is there to reduce such uncertainty and move 
toward a balanced state. Finally, there are relationships which can be defined as triads with a 
structural hole and they are very common in the business world. The buyer maintains relationships 
with its suppliers, regardless of the positive or negative nature of those relationships, when there is 
no relationship between the suppliers. For instance, it occurs in dual sourcing situations practi ced by 
the buyer (McMillan 1990; Richardson & Roumasset 1995; Fujimoto 1999) where the buyer sources 
parts from two competing suppliers who have no direct business ties.  
 
 
2.3 Coalition building 
 
Bastl et al. (2013) stated a coalition as a temporary, means-oriented alliance among players with 
different goals and is distinctly different from collaborative alliances formed through diversification. 
Coalitions have a short-term focus and can take place between two competing actors (e.g. two 
suppliers or two buyers). They defined this relationship as usually informal, non-contractual and less 
enduring as opposed to long-term strategic alliances that are formalized and where actors pursue 
goals which are aligned with the goals of allies (Bastl et al., 2013). 
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Many authors have speculated on how groups form in general. Usually they concentrated on the 
details of the interactions within groups that lead to the development and maintenance of norms, 
roles, and so on, within the group (Tuckman, 1965; Tuckman & Jensen, 1977). Opportunities for 
interaction may lead to coalition formation. In the past, there has been done some research to 
identify networks of interaction within the organization (Fombrun, 1982; Tichy, Tushman, & Fombrun 
1979). Stevenson et al. (1985) stated that these studies did not emphasize om how the organizational 
context may lead to joint actions. Once organizational members perceive their common interests and 
begin to discuss issues, they have taken a first step towards coalition formation. After this there are 
several outcomes possible. It will be possible that the coalition is successful, will learn from it failures 
and will persist in acting over time. Alternatively, the coalition may disband in time and thus would 
be considered a "dormant coalition”. In the (nearby) future the former members can probably 
mobilize to take joint action again with less effort than members of latent coalitions who have never 
taken concerted action (Stevenson et al., 1985). 
 
Before potential coalition participants can form a coalition, they need to perceive or become aware 
of two things: they must perceive an issue or issues that require attention, and they must believe 
that they can form a successful coalition. Therefore, an understanding of the antecedent conditions 
to coalition formation needs to address how issues are recognized by potential participants and the 
kinds of circumstances under which coalition formation is facilitated (Stevenson et al., 1985). Caplow 
(1956) stated that there are 4 assumptions of coalition theory in the buyer-supplier context.  
The first assumption is that there is power asymmetry between the actors in the triad. A more 
powerful player in the triad can and will coerce its power over the weaker player in the triad. In a 
supply network context, the possession of resources can determine the player’s power (Bast et al, 
2013) and can give a competitive advantage (Barney, 2001). Resources can occur in two forms. First 
resources can be determined within the buyer-supplier relationship and have physical (Williamson, 
1975), human (Becker, 1964) and organizational forms (Tomer, 1987). Physical resources comprise an 
organization’s technology, location and access to raw materials. Human resources comprise the 
experience, intelligence and experience of individuals within the organization. Organizational 
resources comprise intellectual property, methods of working and relationships with other 
organizations (Barney, 2001). Secondly, the position of the player within the network can be used as 
a source, for example if a player has access to a player that controls certain resources (Choi & Wu, 
2009). 
 
P2: Coalition building in a buyer-supplier context requires power asymmetry and a more powerful 
player that will coerce its power over weaker players. 
 
The second assumption is that the players in a triad are trying to control each other. It is preferable 
to control the other two players or at least control one player. Opportunities for coalition formation 
depend on the possibility of member interaction, which in turn is facilitated by the freedom of 
movement of potential participants. Bacharach and Lawler (1980) have argued that coalition 
mobilization is more difficult when communication among potential participants is infrequent. There 
must be sufficient opportunity for interaction to form a shared perception of issues and tactics to 
emerge between the potential coalition members. Those who have more discretion in carrying out 
their job responsibilities would be expected to have more opportunities to participate in coalitional 
activity. Those whose work activities are rigidly monitored or controlled would be less likely to 
interact with those outside their immediate work group and thus would be less able to devote 
working time to the pursuit of group activities independent of formal responsibilities. Bacharach and 
Lawler (1980) suggested that the amount of centralized control or discretion delegated to 
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subordinates is likely to affect the probability of coalition formation. Individuals with less discretion 
would have issues forming such alliances. 
 
P3: Each player of a coalition in a buyer-supplier context will try to control the other players. 
 
The third assumption states power is additive, the collective power of a coalition is equal to the sum 
of power of the two players in a coalition. Bast et al. (2013) argued the resultant power from the 
coalition must be greater than that of the dominant player. Otherwise, the new coalition does not 
make sense. The new player introduced to the coalition does not necessarily have to have more 
power. This player needs to have just enough to create a coalition with greater power than the third 
player. So, for the weaker buyer it is important to form a coalition with a strong enough player.  In 
addition to this they stated that potential coalition partners will also influence the mutual interest for 
coalition formation. A mutual interest for coalition formation between two players will be stronger in 
situations where none of the alliance players can individually overpower the third player in a triad. 
 
P4: The resultant power of a coalition in a buyer-supplier context must be greater than the sum of 
the individual power of the players. 
 
The last assumption states the formation of coalitions takes place in an existing triadic situation. 
There is already a relationship which forms the foundation for a coalition. Coalition theory assumes 
the existence of links between triadic players. At the organizational level this implies the existence of 
relationships between buyers and suppliers. Buyers and suppliers can engage in a range of 
relationships, such as transactional, relational (Cannon & Perreault, 1999; Zsidisin & Ellram, 2001), 
formalized (Rossetti & Choi, 2005) and nonformalized (Gil, 2009).  
 
P5: Coalition building in a buyer-supplier context is based on already existing links between the 
players. 
 
 
2.4 Coalition dynamics within buyer-supplier(-supplier) relationships 
 
A buyer supplier relationship is in network terms a system of a dyad with two nodes and one link. 
Each node can be conceptualized as an actor performing activities for generating values (Henderson 
and Quandt 1971; Demsetz 1992). Therefore, they create a link and form a dyad or a buyer supplier 
relationship. Both already are part of a network, so by creating a link they become, indirectly and 
unwittingly a member of each extended business relationships. In addition, Salo et al. (2009) stated 
that business relationships are dynamic entities formed by at least two active parties. The actors are 
not only responsible for the failures, but also perform the recovery efforts, as well the evaluation of 
the efforts. 
 
Before firms start a relationship, they should employ a systematic selection to reduce potential 
relational problems before they arise (Wathne & Heide, 2004). According to Stump and Heide (1996), 
firms should employ selection criteria that reflect the partner’s motivation, such as the partner’s 
“general customer practices and business philosophy”. Wuyts et al. (2015) stated that these 
assertions also occur in triadic service settings: a provider’s customer focus (as reflected in 
institutionalized processes for the generation, dissemination, and analysis of customer insight) 
enhances customer need fulfillment, and may serve as an effective selection criterion.  
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A buying company should first evaluate what kind of relationship it has with the supplier to 
determine the structural embeddedness of a supplier (Choi & Kim, 2008). Embeddedness refers to 
the state of dependence of a company on its suppliers and customers in a supply network structure 
(Ghoshal & Bartlett 1990; Holm, Eriksson & Johanson 1999; Echols & Tsai 2005). The concept of 
structural embeddedness, when applied to supplier management, illuminates that a supplier’s 
performance depends on how it environs itself with other companies (i.e. its suppliers and 
customers) (Choi & Kim, 2008). To gain a desired effect of the structural embeddedness for the 
supplier, the buyer must have a harmoniously relationship with the supplier because the supplier is 
the conduit to the sources the buyer is interested in. So, the buyer needs to identify the key 
companies the supplier is doing business with and the intensity of those relationships to predict the 
supplier’s likelihood of business success as well as how the relationship with the supplier will 
develop. 
 
The scientists studying buyer–supplier relationships have sought theoretical support from other 
disciplines such as a political economy framework (Stern & Reve, 1980), social network research 
(Gulati, 1998; Holm et al., 1999) and complexity theory (Choi et al., 2001). A recurring issue in these 
studies is that the buyer–supplier relationship context should move beyond the traditional dyadic 
context and begin to consider more complex dynamics of relational networks. Some scientists (e.g. 
Olsen & Ellram, 1997; Smith & Laage-Hellman, 1992) have proposed expanding the dyadic buyer–
supplier relationship studies to a triadic context, where buyer–supplier–supplier relational dynamics 
can be considered. 
 
As we focus on these buyer-supplier-supplier relationships, the buyer should, because of its business 
interest, motivate the influence in the nature of the relationship between suppliers (Wu & Choi, 
2010). Many studies concluded that buying companies who relegated supply chain relationship 
management tasks to their suppliers, had their bargaining power diminished because over time such 
a strategy reduced the buyers’ understanding of their suppliers’ business (Mol, 2007; Rossetti & Choi, 
2005; Youngdahl et al., 2008).  Recent supply management studies call such dynamics co-opetition 
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996; Davis, 1993).  
 
Choi et al. (2002) established ‘‘supplier–supplier co-opetition’’ as an archetype of relationships 
between suppliers. Wu and Choi (2005) expanded co-opetitive supplier–supplier relationships to 
include various forms and highlighted the roles that buying firms can play in creating them. The 
interactions between suppliers, or lack thereof, would eventually affect the performance of the 
buyer’s supply chain operations. Therefore, the buyer must be engaged in supplier–supplier 
relationships, otherwise, the buyer stands to lose control of its supply chain.  They illustrated how 
buyers can strategically manage supplier–supplier co-opetition to improve supplier performance. 
Later Wu & Choi (2010) defined supplier–supplier co-opetition as the buyer’s influence activities to 
manage competing suppliers. 
 
Disruption of the supplier’s operations can have immediate and severe consequences on the buyer’s 
operations (Craighead et al., 2007; Latour, 2001; Nishiguchi and Beaudet, 1998). Buyers design the 
supply network and mandate co-opetitive interactions between suppliers by applying purchasing 
leverage. The buyers can directly influence, if necessary by force, the behaviors of the suppliers by 
incentives and penalties to reinforce the desired co-opetitive supplier–supplier relationship (Wu and 
Choi, 2005). Richardson (1993) stated that commitment to a long-term relationship combined with a 
credible threat to switch suppliers allows the buyer to influence suppliers’ behavior. Co-opetitive 
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supplier–supplier dynamics were first observed in the sourcing practices of the Japanese automotive 
industry (Asanuma, 1985; Richardson, 1993). The outcomes of these studies suggested buyers 
sometimes encouraged suppliers to work closely together, while other times they kept the suppliers 
apart. More recent studies suggest that buying firms are proactive in creating co-opetition among 
suppliers to elicit both collaborative synergy and market efficiency (Cross, 1995; Dyer & Nobeoka, 
2000; Sako, 2004; Wu & Choi, 2005). Analyses of supplier–supplier-buyer relationships within various 
industries suggests that co-opetition would produce stronger supplier performance compared to 
competition or cooperation alone (Cross, 1995; Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000; Richardson, 1993; Wu & 
Choi, 2005). When suppliers engage in inter-dependent tasks such as R&D and joint problem solving 
and decision-making, their business processes become more closely coupled (Balakrishnan & 
Geunes, 2004; Ganesan, 1994). Mutual assistance between suppliers helps them to resolve quality 
and technical problems in production (Richardson, 1993; Richardson & Roumasset, 1995). 
Cooperation sparks synergy and induces the creation of both explicit and tacit knowledge (Tallman et 
al., 2004). At the same time, competition between the suppliers creates market efficiency as the 
suppliers vie to win contracts (Choi & Wu, 2009; Lado et al., 1997). 
 
 
2.5 Power(imbalance) and the implications for a weaker buyer 
 
Power is a central issue in business-to-business relationships. Therefore, it has been a captivating 
research area for many scientists. But what can we define as “power”? To understand how coalitions 
are built it is necessary to have an understanding on the definition of power. Dahl ( 1957) defined 
power as “Actor A has a certain power over actor B, in which actor A will let actor B take action which 
he normally wouldn’t do”. Emerson (1962) added to this theory; “The power of actor A over actor B 
is the amount of resistance on the part of actor B which can be overcome by actor A”. So basically, 
power can be defined as the ability to influence or control other persons or organizations. 
 
 Power is not only about influencing and controlling individuals or organizations. Many scholars 
related power to the matter of interdependence of two or more players. Pfeffer (1992) defined 
power as the matter of interdependence; “If A depends on B more than B depends on A, then B has 
power over A”. Similarly, Bacharach and Lawler (1981) stipulates the power-dependence theory as 
“one party's power is a function of the other's dependence, which varies directly with the value the 
second party attributes to the outcomes at stake (outcome value) and inversely with the availability 
of the same or better outcomes from alternative sources (outcome alternatives)” Likewise, Dickson 
(1983) states that the power of one party over another is a function of relative dependence. Finally, 
Anderson and Narus (1990) also use the term relative dependence to refer to the difference between 
a firm’s dependence on its partner and its partner’s dependence on the firm. The primary 
consequence of relative dependence is indicated as power.  
 
So, power and interdependence are related elements and they are generally considered relevant to 
the understanding of buyer–supplier relationships (e.g. Cox, 2001; Frazier & Antia, 1995).  Buchanan 
(1992) conceptualized power-dependence imbalances in buyer–supplier relationships as the 
difference in value that buyers and sellers attach to the relationship. In asymmetric relationships, the 
most independent partner dominates the exchange. For a buyer who is strongly dependent on a 
supplier this means vulnerability (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007). Therefore, they should consider if 
there are sufficient benefits attached to the relationship to offset the obvious disadvantages of such 
a vulnerable and dependent position towards a supplier. On the other hand, purchasers should 
assess the risks of the relationship, and explore possibilities that might increase the bargaining power 
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of their company. So, buyers should always explore the market by scouting for alternative suppliers 
and determining their competencies. 
 
The matter of dependence determines the players power. The possession of resources can 
determine the player’s power and reducing the dependence (Bast et al, 2013) and can give a 
competitive advantage (Barney, 1991).  These resources should be rare, valuable, nonsubstitutable, 
and difficult to imitate. If a firm can accumulate resources with these characteristics then it can gain 
a competitive advantage over its competing firms (Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989). An 
important addition was done by Amit and Schoemaker (1993). They stated that specialization of 
assets is "a necessary condition for rent" and "strategic assets by their very nature are specialized". 
Dyer and Singh (1998) concluded that firms must do something specialized or unique to develop a 
competitive advantage. One way to gain this advantage is by creating assets that are specialized in 
conjunction with the assets of an alliance partner (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978). Resources can 
occur in two forms. First resources can be determined within the buyer-supplier relationship and 
have physical (Williamson, 1975), human (Becker, 1964) and organizational forms (Tomer, 1987). 
Physical resources comprise an organization’s technology, location and access to raw materials. 
Human resources comprise the experience, intelligence and experience of individuals within the 
organization. Organizational resources comprise intellectual property, methods of working and 
relationships with other organizations (Barney, 1991). Secondly, the position of the player within the 
network can be used as a source. There are situations when a weaker actor does not possess all the 
necessary resources to develop a collaborative relationship within the focal dyad (Cai & Yang, 2008). 
In such situations, the weaker actor could tie itself more closely to the stronger actor in the focal 
relationship as well as other actors present in the network that possess the required resources 
(Mukerji and Francis, 2008), i.e. display network collaboration. 
 
As mentioned it is important for firms to specialize in their assets to gain competitive advantage and 
thereby increasing their power in the buyer-supplier-relationship. To know how a firm can specialize 
itself it is necessary to understand what the definition of specifity is. Williamson (1985) identified 
three types of asset specificity: (1) site specificity, (2) physical asset specificity, and (3) human asset 
specificity. Site specificity refers to the situation wherein successive production stages that are 
immobile in nature are located close to one another. Previous studies suggest that site-specific 
investments can substantially reduce inventory and transportation costs and can lower the costs of 
coordinating activities (Dyer, 1996). Physical asset specificity refers to transaction-specific capital 
investments (e.g., in customized machinery, tools, dies, and so on) that tailor processes to particular 
exchange partners. Physical asset specialization has been found to allow for product differentiation 
and may improve quality by increasing product integrity or fit (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991; Nishiguchi, 
1994). Human asset specificity refers to transaction-specific know-how accumulated by transactors 
through longstanding relationships (e.g., dedicated supplier engineers who learn the systems, 
procedures, and the individuals idiosyncratic to the buyer). Human cospecialization increases as 
alliance partners develop experience working together and accumulate specialized information, 
language, and know-how. This allows them to communicate efficiently and effectively, which reduces 
communication errors, thereby enhancing quality and increasing speed to market (Asanuma, 1989; 
Dyer, 1996).  
 
Power imbalance does not always lead to difficulties in a buyer-supplier relationship. It can be very 
effective to use power as coordination of exchange relationships as the distribution of power 
becomes legitimate over time (Maloni & Benton, 2000). The actors will focus on investing in 
developing strong long-term partnerships based on their individual and/or joint motivations (e.g. 
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entering new markets) (Akpinar & Zettinig, 2008) or developing new products based on joint 
research (Anderson et al., 1994). Problems in these relationships will arise when the stronger actor 
misuses and exploits its power position which is not according to the weaker actor’s business 
objectives (Caniels & Gelderman, 2007). This can lead to unproductive relationships (Bobot, 2010) 
resulting in the erosion of any benefit that the weaker actor may possess and consequently causes 
permanent damage to a relationship (Gulati et al., 2008) 
 
According to Caplow’s coalition-theory, Bastl et al. (2013) provided that player A is weak while 
players B and C are stronger and of equal power. The potential coalitions that the weaker player A 
can form are either with B or C. First, player A would seek to improve its position through the 
formulation of a coalition with B or C. Second, as B and C perceive each other as of equal strength, 
they both would welcome the advance of the weaker player A to form a coalition. Third, the coalition 
of B and C is unlikely to form, as neither of the players improves its pre -coalitional position of 
equality with each other and superiority over A. In this situation, the weakest player in all three 
scenarios is in an attractive position as it can form a coalition with either of the stronger players.  
 
P6: The weakness of a buyer adds to his attractiveness for stronger suppliers to form a collation. 
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3 Methodology 
 
 
This chapter expounds the chosen research design. The arguments for this design are explained in 
section 3.1. How the data is going to be collected and the operationalization of this research is 
explained in the sections 3.2 and 3.3.  
 
3.1 Research design 
 
Research can be done in a deductive or inductive way. Deductive research focusses on existing 
theories to develop hypotheses. These hypotheses will be tested and confirmed or rejected, based 
on the observations that are made. Induction is reasoning from the specific to the general level to 
achieve generalization of findings and differences while the observations are made in the beginning 
of the study and should lead to new theories. Inductive research is often associated with qualitative 
methods of data collection (mainly verbal data) and data analysis, in contrary to the deductive 
approach which is more often linked to quantitative methods (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Thomas, 
2006). A case study is especially appropriate when the study is about a contemporary phenomenon 
in real-life contexts and when the subject of study is new (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009).  
 
A case study explores and examines a contemporary real-life phenomenon through detailed 
contextual analysis of a limited number of events or conditions, and their relationships (Zainal, 2007).  
It can be considered a robust research method particularly when a holistic, in-depth investigation is 
required. Yin (1984) defines the case study research method “as an empirical inquiry that research a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.” Scientists 
can adopt either a single-case or multiple-case design depending on the issue. In cases where there 
are no other cases available for replication, the researcher can adopt the single -case design (Zainal, 
2007). In addition, Yin (2009) added that the main distinction between a single case design or a 
multiple case design is the use of a holistic or embedded unit of analysis (Yin, 2009). The drawback of 
a single-case design is its inability to provide a generalizing conclusion, when the events are rare. One 
way of overcoming this is by triangulating of the study with other methods to confirm the validity of 
the process (Zainal, 2007). 
 
There are several categories of a case study. Research questions of the type “how” and “why” are 
suitable for case studies (Yin, 2009). Yin (1984) notes three categories, namely “exploratory”, 
“descriptive” and “explanatory” case studies. Exploratory case studies set to explore any 
phenomenon in the data which serves as a point of interest to the researcher. A descriptive case 
study describes the natural phenomena which occur within the data in question. The goal set by the 
researcher is to describe the data as they occur. McDonough and McDonough (1997) suggest that 
descriptive case studies may be in a narrative form. Finally, explanatory case studies examine the 
data closely both on a surface level and at a more in-depth level to explain the phenomena in the 
data. The researcher may then form a theory and set to test this theory (McDonough and 
McDonough, 1997).  
 
For this study, I will use an inductive method within an exploratory case study. There are several 
arguments for this design. Although there is some theory on coalition building on the triadic level, 
there is no research done based on the perspective from a weaker buyer. Therefore, this research 
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addresses a knowledge gap. The purpose of the study is not to test the theoretical model of coalition 
building on the triadic level, but to extend the body of knowledge. The lack of scientific 
understanding on this subject justifies an explorative in-depth case study analysis of the subject. 
Gaining a rich and new understanding in this specific case on coalition building in triads from the 
perspective of a weaker buyer might lead to generalizability to other branches. Although the study is 
conducted in a relatively small and unique context and setting it is expected that the findings will be 
generizable. Secondly, coalition building is a dynamic process with many variables that influence each 
other reciprocally, affecting actors and supply chains embedded in the networks (Theodorakopoulos, 
2012). A case study approach is considered appropriate as it is likely to discover a rich and new 
understanding of the process of coalition building in triads.  In a case study research it is possible to 
observe the complex processes and all the variables involved (Yin, 2009).  To answer the problem 
statement, it is necessary to gain deep insights in the complex and dynamic processes of coalition 
building, especially of the dynamics of the organizations and persons within the triad with all their 
values, opinions, behaviors and relationships. Finally, a real-life phenomenon cannot be separated 
from its context and the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are difficult to determine 
(Yin, 2009). The process of coalition building is difficult and the case is unique. Therefore, it is difficult 
to determine clear standards and make it preferable to conduct a case study.  
 
To enable triangulation not only the interviews are used as data, but documents as well to confirm 
the validity of the process (Zainal, 2007). Therefore, business plans, minutes, e-mails, etc. will be 
used as a source. This will give a good understanding of the data involved and a well understanding 
of all the variables. 
 
From the literature review six propositions have been extracted as mentioned below. These 
propositions are based on a relatively small number of subjects from a unique case in the military-
civil business relationship.  
 
 Proposition 
P1 The interaction of suppliers in a triadic relationship affects the operational performance of 
the buyer. 
P2 Coalition building in a buyer-supplier context requires power asymmetry and a more 
powerful player that will coerce its power over weaker players. 
P3 Each player of a coalition in a buyer-supplier context will try to control the other players. 
P4 The resultant power of a coalition in a buyer-supplier context must be greater than the 
sum of the individual power of the players. 
P5 Coalition building in a buyer-supplier context is based on already existing links between 
the players. 
P6 The weakness of a buyer adds to his attractiveness for stronger suppliers to form a 
collation. 
 
 
3.2 Data collection 
 
The study will be conducted within a military-civil buyer-supplier relationship. To be clearer in the 
buyer-supplier-supplier triad in which the Netherlands Ministry of Defence (NLD MoD) is the buyer. 
There is a dyadic relationship between MATLOGXO and Krauss-Maffei Wegmann GmbH & Co. KG 
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(KMW). KMW leads the European market for highly protected wheeled and tracked vehicles. At 
locations in Germany, Brazil, Greece, Mexico, The Netherlands, Singapore, the United Kingdom, the 
USA and Turkey more than 4.000 employees develop, manufacture and support a product portfolio 
ranging from air-transportable, highly protected wheeled vehicles through reconnaissance, anti-
aircraft and artillery systems to main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and bridge laying 
systems. In addition, KMW has wide-ranging system competence in civil and military simulation, as 
well as in command and information systems and remote-controlled weapon stations with 
reconnaissance and observation equipment. The armed forces of more than 50 nations worldwide 
rely on tactical systems by KMW (source: website Krauss-Maffei Wegmann GmbH & Co. KG). 
 
The second supplier in this buyer-supplier-supplier triad is the firm Van Halteren Groep. This 
company with more than 250 employees is an independent and autonomous organization. One of 
the main business units is Van Halteren Special Products (VHSP)1, this unit produces products and 
services of high quality standards to the international defence market and Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEM). VHSP has a close cooperation with the NLD MoD based on the different 
phases of the product-life-cycle of ground based vehicles, for instance maintenance, modification 
and abduction. Thereby they prefer to cooperate with the OEM in the development of new 
equipment (source: website Van Halteren Groep). 
 
The selection of the single case study is based on some criteria. First, the research had to be done 
from the perspective of a weaker buyer. Although there is some theory about coalition building on 
the triadic level (Bastl et al., 2013) this has never been done from the perspective of a weaker buyer. 
The NLD MoD in this case meets the criteria. In the literature review it was mentioned that in 
asymmetric relationships, the most independent partner dominates the exchange. For a buyer who is 
strongly dependent on a supplier this means vulnerability (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007). The NLD 
MoD is strongly dependent on KMW and therefore the weaker player in the triad. This brings us to 
the second criteria in this case selection. A triad is the smallest form of a network (Choi and Wu, 
2009). Mostly buyer-supplier relations are described in a dyadic form. An important, self-imposed, 
limitation arises while the case study is executed within the Ministry of Defence, because of the 
professional background of the researcher. This reduces the suitable number of cases strongly. The 
selected case is unique, especially while VHSP is a key supplier of the NLD MoD and has close 
connections with KMW. VHSP is more powerful relative to the NLD MoD because of their high 
qualified knowledge, experience, and connections which are not available to the NLD MoD.   
 
Professional contacts within the NLD MoD will be used to select and contact relevant persons within 
KMW, VHSP and MoD. These keypersons are listed on priority, based on the specific case, to gain the 
most valid information for analyzing. As mentioned this research is of qualitative nature. Therefore, 
interviews with the selected keypersons is the main instrument for gathering data. The questions will 
be semi-structured and open-ended. The advantage of using semi-structured questions is that it 
gains more flexibility to the interviewer and provides the possibility for more in-depth 
understandings of some subjects. The keypersons will be asked to identify other suitable 
respondents within their organization. This should lead to five respondents per organization. The 
respondents are professionals from various functional areas and have a direct influence in the buyer-
supplier-supplier triad between the NLD MoD-KMW-VHSP. The interviews will be conducted in the 
period between February 2017 and March 2017. The estimation is that each interview will take 
                                                                 
1
 In the past VHSP was named Stork Special Products and Novek. In certain documents the former names are 
used. 
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approximately 60 minutes, depending on the answers of the respondents. To gain a good 
understanding of the data, minutes will be made and the interviews will be recorded as well. It is 
preferable that the interviews are conducted in a face-to-face setting. Depending on the availability 
of the respondents it might be necessary to deflect and conduct the interview by telephone. One 
week in advance the respondents will receive information on the background of the research, 
information on the subject and the interview questions to prepare themselves for the interview. In 
appendix A, the names and positions of the respondents are mentioned. 
 
 
3.3 Operationalisation 
Operationalization in qualitative research is the development of specific operational definitions of 
the concepts. In paragraph 3.1 six propositions have been nominated based on the literature as 
discussed in the literature review (Chapter 2). Now the theoretical concepts of the propositions will 
be transferred into operational definitions. Which shall be used for analyzing the gathered data.  
 
 Interaction between suppliers is met if their business processes become more closely 
coupled (Balakrishnan & Geunes, 2004; Ganesan, 1994) by resolving quality and technical 
problems in production (Richardson, 1993; Richardson & Roumasset, 1995) and the creation 
of both explicit and tacit knowledge (Tallman et al., 2004) 
 A triad is established if one player in a dyad decides to coalesce with a third player (Choi & 
Wu, 2009a; Harland, 1996; Mentzer, DeWitt, Keebler, Soonhoong, Nancy, Smith, & Zacharia, 
2001). 
 Operational performance refers to integrated supply chains partners who can be responsive 
to volatile demand resulting from frequent changes in competition, technology, regulation, 
etc. (Dyer, 1996; Grant, 1996). 
 To consider a group as a coalition the following 8 characteristics must be present: “an 
interacting group of individuals, deliberately constructed, independent of the formal 
structure, lacking its own internal formal structure, consisting of mutually perceived 
membership, issue oriented, focused on a goal or goals external to the coalition, and 
requiring concerted member action” (Stevenson et al. 1985) 
 Coalition building consist of organizational members perceiving common interests and 
discussing issues (Stevenson et al., 1985) and building and mobilizing support among those 
who already agree on a certain outcome (Pfeffer, 1992) 
 Power is conducted if actor A will let actor B act which he normally wouldn’t do (Dahl, 1957) 
and the amount of resistance on the part of actor B which can be overcome by actor A 
(Emerson, 1962) 
 The players power is determined by its possession of resources and should be rare, valuable, 
nonsubstitutable, and difficult to imitate (Bast et al, 2013). Resources have physical 
(Williamson, 1975), human (Becker, 1964) and organizational forms (Tomer, 1987).  
 Control is the possibility of member interaction and the freedom of movement of potential 
participants in coalition formation (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980). 
 The resultant power of a coalition is a bundle of resources that provide unique and difficult 
to-imitate value, which results in increased power position of a coalition against its 
counterparts in a network and is stronger than the power of the dominant player (Harrison 
et al. 1991, 2001). 
 The formation of coalitions takes place in an existing triadic situation (Caplow, 1956). Buye rs 
and suppliers can engage in a range of relationships, such as transactional, relational (Cannon 
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& Perreault, 1999; Zsidisin & Ellram, 2001), formalized (Rossetti & Choi, 2005) and 
nonformalized (Gil, 2009). 
 A buyer is the weaker player if the power-dependence is in imbalance in favor of the supplier 
because of the value attached to the relation (Buchanan, 1992).  
 Attractiveness refers to the situation that a weaker buyer can hold information or expertise 
that is valued by another firm (Maloni & Benton, 2000).  
 
These operational definitions are translated in a clear set of questions and will be used in the 
interviews. In the interviews the respondents will answer the questions which should lead to a clear 
understanding on how coalitions are built from the perspective of a weaker buyer. 
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4 Results 
 
In this chapter, the findings will be presented to answer the problem statement “How are coalitions 
built in buyer-supplier networks from the perspective of a weaker buyer on a triadic level?” in 
accordance with the six propositions. The chapter is built up by firstly a short background on the 
focus organization and continues in discussing the propositions per paragraph. The propositions will 
be evaluated based on the interviews and the documents which have been researched. Each 
paragraph will conclude with an evaluation of the proposition and will be discussed if there is 
support for the proposition. The findings are the result of data collection- and study, and intensive 
interviews with stakeholders in the buyer-supplier-supplier-triad. The case analysis commenced with 
the identification of meaningful text segments extracted from the interviews that relate to the topic. 
To this end, decisions were made about what is important and less important in the data. These text 
segments will be related to the available data in documents, minutes, procedures, contracts, email, 
etc..  
 
4.1 Background of the organization 
 
The case organization MATLOGCO is part of the NLD MoD, to be more specific, it is an organization of 
the Royal Netherlands Army (RNLA). The organizational structure is described in Appendix C. 
MATLOGCO is responsible for the sustainment of all land based systems to support users to fulfill 
operational tasks. MATLOGCO sustains modern, robust, safe and high-quality ground based weapon 
systems and supports operational units in optimizing their operational tasks. MATLOGCO supports 
these tasks through supplying equipment, personnel and expertise. 
 
There can be five primary tasks distinguished for MATLOGCO: 
 
1. Performing analyzes during the product-life-cycle, to obtain data in the performance and costs, 
now and for the future, of present- and future (weapon)systems and supplies.  
 
2. Creating and offering knowledge of the performance and costs, now and for the  future, of present- 
and future (weapon)systems and supplies. 
 
3. Supplying- and sustainment of goods in a buyer role to fulfill the requirement of goods and 
services of the assortment. 
 
4. Directing, coordinating and performing the Intermediate Level Maintenance (ILM) and Depot Level 
Maintenance (DLM) of ground based systems and contracting and sustaining lasting cooperation with 
external civil partners. 
 
5. Purchasing, sustaining and disposing of supporting systems during the product-life-cycle. 
 
MATLOGCO has contracts with SystemOEM’s and OEM’s of Line replaceable units (LRU) within the 
Defence-industry. This branch is characterized by a limited number of SystemOEM’s as integrators 
and a high number of sub suppliers. Further characterizes the branch itself by a high 
interdependence between the organizations and changing roles and coalitions of the organizations in 
“buyer”, “supplier” or “partner”. There are contracts with KMW and VHSP as well. In certain cases, 
VHSP executes the contracts which are agreed between KMW and MATLOGCO.  
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As mentioned in primary task no 4 there is a cooperation with civil partners. MATLOGCO has 
contracts with several SystemOEM’s, which are most of the time system integrators, and LRU-OEM’s. 
Within the NLD MoD systems are in use which have been manufactured by KMW. The contract 
between NLD MoD and KMW are ministered by MATLOGCO. The repair of LRU’s is part of these 
contracts as well as supplying certain spare parts. VHSP is an independent manufacturer in the 
Defence-industry. They are a licensee of KMW for the LRU-repair and on order of KMW they are 
authorized to conduct activities based on the contract between KMW and certain buyers. 
 
In the past several broken LRU’s were send directly to KMW in Germany. This proces caused several 
disadvantages. Firstly, the turnaround times were long because of the geographical distance and 
problems in communication. Personnel of MATLOGCO were not able to organize quick face-to-face 
meetings because of the mentioned distances. Futher more, in some cases, the language barrier 
could be a problem for efficient and effective coordination. Secondly, there was not enough 
knowledge within MATLOGCO. Certain LRU’s were send to KMW which were not broken or easy to 
repair. This caused a lower status of the rate of operational performance of the systems and by 
sending the articles to KMW it created unnecessary costs. As an alternative, it was possible to keep 
more articles in stock, which would create higher costs. In the Programme of Requirements 
(MATLOGCO, 2017) MATLOGCO stated that strategic LRU’s should be filtered by Afdeling TECH of 
MATLOGCO before sending them to the supplier for repairmaintenance. One of the aims of the filter 
function is to filter out LRU’s with no failure found or only the need for small repairs whith no 
necessity to send them to the suppliers.  
 
The NLD MoD today is limited in its equipment and is characterized by its expense and high 
complexity. Budget and qualified personnel to maintain these systems are limited as well. These 
elements create a condition in which the NLD MoD should find alternatives to maintain the 
performance of the operational (weapon)systems by decreasing budgets. One of the possible 
solutions is a need for the NLDMoD to find coalition partners within the industry. For this the Land 
Maintenance Initiative was introduced by high-ranking officers of the RNLA in close cooperation with 
the staff of MATLOGCO and Defensie Materieel Organisatie (DMO). The aim of the initiative was to 
bring industrial companies related to the RNLA together and use the networks in favor of all the 
involved partners (Academie voor Overheidscommunicatie, 2013). One of the most important 
elements was to increase the mutual trust in each other and understanding their procedures, 
possibilities and restrictions. The initiative started with five companies and Van Halteren was one of 
these members. 
 
Figure 2 Buyer-Supplier-Supplier relationship MATLOGCO-KMW-VHSP 
 
KMW 
SystemOEM 
VHSP 
Licensee 
MATLOGCO 
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In the past MATLOGCO had a dyadic relation with KMW. Broken equipment was repaired by 
MATLOGCO or, if essential specific knowledge was needed, send to KMW as the System Original 
Equipment Manufacturer (SystemOEM). In the Netherlands, there are licensees of the SystemOEM’s. 
VHSP is a licensee of KMW and is authorized to do specific work on specific equipment (especially Line 
Replaceable Units (LRU)) which are part of by KMW manufactured systems  (Major W.H. Nieboer, 
MATLOGCO, Contractmanager) 
 
There is a clear mutually relationship. The main contractor is KMW and this company has designated 
VHSP as its subcontractor for The Netherlands. In the past equipment was send directly to KMW, now 
VHSP is involved. (Mr. R.J. Harbers, MATLOGCO, Contractmanager) 
 
KMW is the contractor of systems which are bought from KMW. For a specific part VAN HALTEREN is 
the maintainer. Specific LRU’s (as part of the KMW-systems) are maintained by VHSP in Zwolle. 
MATLOGCO/ Afdeling TECHNIEK has a cooperation with VHSP (Mr. M. Bos, MATLOGCO, Hoofd 
Producteenheid Componentenherstel) 
 
 
4.2 P1: The interaction of suppliers and operational buyer performance 
 
4.2.1 Interaction between suppliers 
In the development of new systems there is a close cooperation between KMW and VHSP. The cause 
for this is that KMW is the SystemOEM and system integrator of the LRU’s, while VHSP is a producer 
of certain LRU’s (LRU-OEM) of the system. To optimize the system VHSP, as the LRU-OEM, is involved 
in the development of these systems. To do this there is an intensive exchange of knowledge and 
information between KMW and VHSP in development. For example, VHSP is the worldwide main 
producer of blade wheels for (armored) vehicles. Although KMW can manufacture blade wheels as 
well, a customer can demand that blade wheels produced by VHSP are used. The NLD MoD demands 
these wheels on systems which are currently in development. This causes an interaction of KMW as 
the system integrator and VHSP as the LRU-OEM to share knowledge for integrating the LRU in the 
system and to optimize the performance. In the Defence-industry these interactions between 
SystemOEM’s and LRU-OEM’s in the development phase of systems is common and done by other 
SystemOEM’s like Rheinmetall as well. This example illustrates the complex relationship. KMW and 
VHSP can be each others partner, buyer, supplier or competitor in the same time. 
 
Especially in the development phase the exchange of knowledge and information is vital. During the 
sustainment phase an even more interesting aspect of more closely coupled business processes can 
be seen. This occurs through the fact that KMW is able to and will shift overflow in capacity to VHSP. 
There are many foreign Defence-organizations who are using the same systems as the NLD MoD and 
having a contract with KMW as well, but do not have a formal relationship to VHSP. If KMW is facing 
a lack of capacity to execute maintenance of certain LRU’s they can shift capacity to VHSP and they 
will execute the orders in the name of KMW.  
 
   
“There is a complex situation while KMW is not only a partner but in some cases also a competitor. 
Therefor close coordination of the business relation is very important. (Mr. M. Werkman, VHSP, 
Accountmanager) 
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 “In the development phase VHSP is mostly involved for the development of the blade wheel of the 
vehicle and often also the AC/NBC-systems. This is a common way in this branch, and done by 
companies like for example Rheinmetall. So, the development is done together. This is necessary 
because all the LRU’s must be integrated in the system. This is a dyad between KMW and VHSP and 
not a triad.” (Mr. P. van den Bergh, VHSP, Accountmanager) 
 
“KMW and VHSP support each other in case of a lack of capacity. VHSP has certain spare parts which 
can be used for certain LRU’s. VHSP is able to conduct maintenance for foreign MoD’s in the name of 
KMW.” (Mr. R.J. Harbers, MATLOGCO, Contractmanager) 
 
4.2.2 Operational performance 
In the Programme of Requirements (MATLOGCO, 2017) MATLOGCO subscribes it should optimally 
use the knowledge in KMW’s industry supply chain. Therefore, if required, MATLOGCO Afdeling TECH 
can communicate directly with the LRU OEM or LRU license holder. Using VHSP as a licensee of KMW 
has multiple benefits for the NLD MoD. First, the out-of-service times are shorter because of the 
physical distances. In the past, the LRU’s were send to KMW in Germany. KMW decides if the LRU 
was repaired by themselves or by one of the many sub suppliers. Now the LRU’s are send directly to 
VHSP. Secondly, communication is easier. There is not the problem with the difference in language. 
Language causes problems in the accurate understanding of specific technical problems or 
procedures. Therefor the distance makes it easier to communicate between the organizations. The 
distances are short and this makes it easier to have physical contact through organizing meetings and 
visits. An indirect advantage of the mentioned benefits is possibly the most important. By using VHSP 
as a licensee, MATLOGCO is no longer isolated. The direct contact with VHSP enables direct influence 
in the processes and contributes directly to the position of MATLOGCO in the triad.  The last benefit is 
directly related to the previous subparagraph and is a result of the cooperation between the 
SysteOEM and the LRU-OEM in the development phase. As mentioned in the previous paragraph NLD 
MoD can demand the use of certain LRU’s and by doing this the System OEM and the LRU-OEM are 
forced to cooperate in planning, processes and in the exchange of knowledge and information.  
 
“The most important benefit for using al local licensee is a partner who supports us in possible 
solutions, with optimal contacts and communication, and short turnaround times. The primary 
benefits are on the operational level, including the exchange of knowledge.” (Major Ir. R.H.J. 
Ceuleers, MATLOGCO, Clustermanager) 
 
“The most important benefit by using VHSP as a licensee is that MATLOGCO has “a shop around the 
corner”. VHSP is because of its specific capacities an important player for MATLOGCO. This position is 
created by them by their cooperation with KMW.” (Major N.G.W. van Schip, MATLOGCO, Stafofficier 
Toegevoegd & Externe Contacten) 
 
“By the cooperation of the suppliers a better understanding is created to optimize the performance of 
the systems in general.” (Major W.H. Nieboer, MATLOGCO, Contractmanager) 
 
4.2.3 Evaluation of the proposition 
KMW and VHSP are suppliers of the NLD MoD and their business processes are highly interacted. 
One of the causes for this is the highly integrated Defence-branch with a limited number of main 
suppliers and many sub suppliers. This highly integration creates a situation in which KMW and VHSP 
can work in the same projects and can be supplier, buyer or partner in the same time and makes 
their processes more coupled. VHSP is a full licensee of KMW and is allowed to conduct operations 
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for the NLD MoD in the name of KMW. On behalf of MATLOGCO VHSP was introduced in the dyadic 
relation between MATLOGCO and KMW. A triad is established if one player in a dyad decides to 
coalesce with a third player. There is a clear triadic relation between KMW, VHSP and MATLOGCO. 
Introducing VHSP into the relation had several benefits for especially MATLOGCO. Turn-around-times 
became shorter, costs were lower, knowledge could increase and the avai lability of operational 
systems increased. Introducing VHSP into the triad had a direct influence on the operational 
performance of MATLOGCO.  Therefore the conclusion is that there is substantial empirical evidence 
found to support the proposition. 
 
 
4.3 P2: Coalition building and the exercise of power over weaker players 
 
4.3.1 Coalition process of the Taskforce Power Pack 
Within the triad there is a difference in goals. KMW and VHSP have a clear focus on making profit, 
which is normal for a profit-organization. The primary goal for MATLOGCO is to optimize the 
operational readiness of the ground based (weapon)systems. Although there is a difference in goals, 
there is a common understanding in sharing knowledge. This is especially applicable between 
MATLOGCO and VHSP. As we speak there is not much knowledge available within MATLOGCO. In the 
past MATLOGCO has send many articles to the SystemOEM which were not broken (30%) or easily to 
repair (30%). In the Business Case Motorenproefstand (MATLOGCO, 2014) is stated that the 
repairproces of LRU’s, for disassembling and rebuilding, is unnecessary long. Sometimes, because of 
these long processes, the stocks are not sufficient to keep the number of systems operational on an 
agreed level. This can be reduced by buying more LRU’s, but this will be very expensive. This was an 
undesirable situation and MATLOGCO would focus on knowledge building to become a “Knowledge 
center”. According to the Business Case Motorenproefstand (MATLOGCO, 2014) MATLOGCO can, by 
introducing a filter at Afdeling Logistiek, become a "smart maintainer" and "smart buyer". By 
expanding the level of knowledge the costs would be reduced, availability of the articles will be 
higher and in long term the operational readiness of the (weapon)systems will increase. Secondly, by 
investing in knowledgebuilding the dependence of MATLOGCO on the SystemOEM will reduce and its 
power position in future contract arrangements will increase. MATLOGCO has produced a 
competence-matrix (MATLOGCO, 2015) in which is prioritized what kind of knowledge is important 
for the sustainment of the (weapon)systems and if this is achieved so far. 
 
For VHSP there is also an importance for MATLOGCO becoming a knowledge center and should lead 
to an extend of the exchange of high valuable information and enables VHSP to learn more of the 
systems during extreme use (for example; use in combat situations with extreme climatically 
conditions like Afghanistan). With these experiences, they will be able to optimize the LRU’s and can 
affect their position. Between MATLOGCO and VHSP a taskforce was created for the exchange of 
knowledge and cooperation regarding power packs. If this project is successful the focus should shift 
to other LRU’s as well. Mutual intentions were agreed and formalized in a “Letter of Intent” 
(MATLOGCO, NOVEK, 2015) between VHSP and MATLOGCO. In the “Letter of Intent” there was 
agreed to create a taskforce for Maintenance Repair Overhaul (MRO) for power packs. The diversity 
of the (ground based) systems used by the NLD MoD, their limited numbers and the necessity to 
sustain the knowledge within MATLOGCO made it necessary to have a refocus on the MRO-proces. 
 
The purpose from the perspective of MATLOGCO is to reduce the Turn-around-Time, sustaining 
knowledge and reducing the costs and making this more manageable. For this taskforce, a research 
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was conducted and the findings are written in the document “Taskforce MRO Power Packs” (Staf 
Commando Landstrijdkrachten, 2015) and led to some interesting conclusions: 
 
- The ambitions of MATLOGCO and VHSP are complementary or can be made complementary. 
- VHSP already repairs merely engines and transmissions out of the scope of the taskforce. 
This is ordered by MATLOGCO Afdeling Techniek or by a SystemOEM, for example KMW. 
- The involved LRU’s are all part of several contracts. This implies limitations in freedom of 
choice were to administer the contracts. If consensus is met between VHSP and the 
SystemOEM to repair the LRU’s under the  license opportunities will emerge.    
- By examining the possibilities to intensify the cooperation between VHSP and MATLOGCO in 
the filter function and small repair work, the Turn-around-time will be influenced positively 
and the serviceability of the LRU expands. By developing the filter function of MATLOGCO 
Afdeling Techniek, in close coordination with VHSP, the costs will reduce and the avai lability 
of (weapon)systems will increase.   
 
The primary focus was on MATLOGCO and VHSP. During the research on the MRO Power pack it 
became obvious that it was impossible and against the wish of MATLOGCO and VHSP as well to 
bypass KMW as the SystemOEM. KMW has the possession of certain resources based on knowledge 
and experience which are elementary to MATLOGCO and VHSP. Therefore it was obvious to 
MATLOGCO and VHSP that KMW had to stay the formal contractor and was an essential part of the 
triad. The implication is a shift of responsibilities. The maintenance role of KMW shifted to VHSP and 
KMW is the contractor who is responsible for the formal aspects of the contracts and the system 
configuration.  The direct benefit for KMW for offering the LRU’s directly to VHSP by MATLOGCO is 
additional fee of 15% is charged to MATLOGCO.  
 
 The SystemOEM and VHSP have a focus on making profit while the NLD MoD has a focus on the 
material employability. There is an understanding of each other’s goals, but each organization within 
the triad has its own role. (Lieutenant-Colonel C.M. Luteijn, MATLOGCO, Accountmanager) 
 
“There are some characteristics in the current situation. It is questionable if all of these 8 
characteristics are present and complied by the organizations. For sure there is a cooperation with a 
mutual dependence.” (Major W.H. Nieboer, MATLOGCO, Contractmanager) 
 
“Afdeling techniek of MATLOGCO wants to become a “smart adviser” to give advice on an optimized 
maintenance proces. If you are on the same level of knowledge with the suppliers you will be able to 
make qualitative well thought proposals.” (Mr. Ing. R.A. Herruer, DMO, Hoofd Bureau Techniek) 
 
“Exchange of technical information is very important for VHSP. It is relevant to know how the systems 
functioning during different kind of use. The use of the systems during operations are not comparable 
with the use in The Netherlands. The use during these operations have a direct influence on the 
performance. VHSP needs to have detailed feedback about the performance to optimize the systems 
with KMW. Therefore, a high level of technical experience is in the benefit of VHSP.” (Mr. P. van den 
Bergh, VHSP, Accountmanager) 
 
“A few years ago, I established the Taskforce MRO Power Pack. This was after a meeting of the 
commander of MATLOGCO with VHSP.” (Mr. Ing. R.A. Herruer, DMO, Hoofd Bureau Techniek) 
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 “Negative effect is the additional fee of approximately 15% which is charged by KMW for using VHSP 
as a licensee” (Major N.G.W. van Schip, MATLOGCO, Stafofficier Toegevoegd & Externe Contacten) 
 
4.3.2 Possession of resources 
All three organizations have a certain degree of power within the triad because of their resources 
and its relationship to the phases of the system. There are three phases, the “development phase”, 
the “sustainment phase” and the “elimination phase”. In the first phase, there is primary a dyadic 
relation between the NLD MoD and KMW. KMW will develop a new system, NLD MoD is in the 
position to demand its wishes of the configuration because they have “the power of the money”. 
When the contract is formalized the primary power shifts to KMW. KMW will coerce the 
implementation of the arrangements in the contract. When the contract period comes to an end 
MATLOGCO is legally free to join another partner. Practically this seems impossible. MATLOGCO 
made an (informal) inventory (email Harbers, 2016) was of all the consequences for separating 
contracts that would be arranged with the sub suppliers. There are some important reasons why 
KMW cannot be left as the main contractor. In the first place KMW is the system configurator, they 
will decide if (midlife)updates are necessary. By leaving KMW these system updates will not be done 
anymore which will lead to system degradation. Secondly, the Defence-branch is very limited in scale 
so for certain spare parts there are no other suppliers available. Third, by extracting the contract of 
MATLOGCO with KMW, the contract would become marginal and KMW might end the rest of the 
contract. Although VHSP would be able to have a direct relationship with MATLOGCO it could have 
consequences in their relationship with KMW. In this branche there is a high interdependence 
between the companies. A disturbance of the relations is undesirable to all the parties involved.  
 
 “KMW is the most powerful player in the triad. Within MATLOGCO an inventory was made of the 
benefits of KMW as main contractor and the possibility to place KMW outside the triad. This inventory 
made clear that the role of KMW was necessary within the triad.” (Mr. R.J. Harbers, MATLOGCO, 
Contractmanager) 
 
“NLD MoD has the power of the money. In this branch, there are just a few suppliers and creates a 
certain dependence for NLD MoD. If no alternatives are arranged in the contract, then NLD MoD is 
dependent upon the power of the SystemOEM.” (Lieutenant-Colonel C.M. Luteijn, MATLOGCO, 
Accountmanager) 
 
“KMW is recognizable as the most powerful player, because in some cases they are a monopolist. On 
the other hand, NLD MoD has the power of the money. Although, this is not effectively if NLD MoD is 
forced to buy at KMW. VHSP is also the weaker player to KMW, because KMW is able to decide which 
companies are licensees of KMW.” (Major N.G.W. van Schip, MATLOGCO, Stafofficier Toegevoegd & 
Externe Contacten) 
 
“VHSP tries to keep its independence to all companies in the branch. Therefore maintaining the 
relations with all companies is of high importance. MATLOGCO wished to take certain elements out of 
the contract with KMW and bring these under a direct contract with VHSP. This was felt as a threat to 
KMW and could influence the relations for VHSP.” (Mr. M. Werkman, VHSP, Accountmanager) 
 
4.3.2 Use of power 
MATLOGCO is during the sustainment phase the weaker player by using KMW as the contractor. This 
is not only because of the reasons mentioned before but also a self-made choice. For a system, there 
are merely LRU-OEM’s and it is possible to arrange contracts with these suppliers instead of using 
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KMW as a single point of contact. This should lead to expanding and sustaining of strategic 
knowledge and skills to create a higher serviceability of the systems on (probably) lower costs. 
MATLOGCO does not have the capacity to arrange and control all these contracts and prefers to be 
serviced by one main contractor as KMW and as a result creates a highly dependency of MATLOGCO 
on KMW.  
 
In this triad KMW is the dominant player. Although this organization is powerful it did not coerce its 
power. The closer cooperation between MATLOGCO and VHSP might influence the position of KMW. 
At the same time MATLOGCO and VHSP are aware of the importance of KMW as the contractor and 
system configurator. Secondly, the branch is characterized by its complex relations and 
interdependence. Therefore, a harmonious relationship within the triad is essential for all the 
organizations and MATLOGCO and VHSP are not willing to endanger this relationship. They will not 
take the risk to challenge KMW, because that is not in their benefit.  
 
 “There was deliberation to distract items from the contract with KMW and offer in a direct business 
relationship to VHSP. It made clear that this wouldn’t create an undesired situation, while this would 
cause more contracts to manage.” (Major Ir. R.H.J. Ceuleers, MATLOGCO, Clustermanager) 
 
“NLD MoD is creating by themselves a dependence on KMW. This is caused by a lack of capacity and 
knowledge.” (Mr. M. Bos, MATLOGCO, Hoofd Producteenheid Componentenherstel)  
 
“The benefit is servicing. In the past there was a higher availability of personnel capacity within the 
NLD MoD and enabled them to manage the contracts. Now, with the lack of personnel, the minimum 
is to guarantee enough knowledge of the content of the contracts.” (Mr. Ing. R.A. Herruer, DMO, 
Hoofd Bureau Techniek) 
 
“To VHSP it is very important to have kind relations. A conflict might have a negative effect on other 
contracts.” (Mr. M. Werkman, VHSP, Accountmanager) 
 
“VHSP advised NLD MoD to continue the triad. Integration of the systems makes it necessary to keep 
a transparant relation with the SystemOEM.” (Mr. P. van den Bergh, VHSP, Accountmanager) 
 
4.3.3 Evaluation of the proposition 
KMW and VHSP are profit-organizations and their primary objective is to make profit. MATLOGCO 
has a complete different goal, as a non-profit organization part of the NLD MoD there is no focus on 
making a profit, instead there is a focus on optimizing the operational readiness of the ground based 
(weapon)systems. Although this is an important difference there are also important mutual interests. 
Knowledge is important for especially MATLOGCO and VHSP. By increasing the filter function at 
Afdeling TECHNIEK of MATLOGCO the level of knowledge will increase and creates a better position 
within the triad for MATLOGCO. For VHSP it is also relevant to gain more knowledge, because 
knowledge can increase their position within the branch. At the same time, they are aware that the 
businessrelation with KMW should be continued. The Defence-industry is very limited, therefore 
VHSP has a dependency on a good relationship with KMW. MATLOGCO is not able to handle all the 
contracts by itself and is dependent on KMW as well, which is actual a voluntary dependency. 
 
Power within this triad is depending on the phase of the product-life-cycle. In the development 
phase there is more power for NLD MoD. During the research this was several times mentioned as 
“the power of the money”. When the contract is implemented the power shifts to KMW. There is no 
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pro-active attitude of KMW in coercing its power although it is obvious KMW is the absolute 
dominant power. MATLOGCO and VHSP cannot and will not cooperate without KMW. So there is no 
need for KMW to coerce its power. There is not enough empirical evidence to support the 
proposition.   
 
 
4.4 P3: Players try to control the other players 
 
4.4.1 Control  
Within the triad, the transfer of information is overt, open and free. Business relations within the 
defence-industry are long-lasting, therefore all organizations are aware of the importance of 
harmonious relationships. The members have common understanding of sharing information and are 
overt towards eachother. Communication can be described in terms of technical exchange and 
contractual exchange. Secondly, most information is common and there is not an embargo on 
sharing. According to the document ‘Verslag LRU-herstel” (MATLOGCO, 2016) there are currently 
negotiations being held on new contracts. All involved members join together in working groups and 
information that is discussed in the meetings is shared among the members.  Although information 
sharing is open, there are some ways for the NLD MoD to control KMW and VHSP. Firstly, in the 
contract negotiation with KMW the prices offered by KMW will be verified by the Audit Dienst Rijk 
(ADR). This institute of the Dutch government will check if the prices are in compliance with the 
market. The second form of control is the “Toezichthouder Leveranciers Defensie” (TLD), this person 
is working at VHSP and is responsible to control if the procedures are proceeded as demanded by the 
NLD MoD. Although these tools of control are available to none of the parties these are means to 
coerce power.  
 
Sharing of regular communication and information will most probably be beneficial to all parties. 
MATLOGCO stated in the Programme of Requirements (MATLOGCO, 2017) information exchange will 
not be charged as an additional service to MATLOGCO. Typical areas for the information exchange 
between MATLOGCO Afdeling TECH and LRU OEM or LRU license holder are: 
Regular: 
-       Maintenance Analysis 
-       Utilization profile/ examples from real life usage 
-       Update on diagnostic methods discovered 
-       Areas of improvements / suggestion of improvements 
Incidental: 
-       Practical remote/physical support on unfamiliar failures 
-       Practical remote/physical support on agreed DLM activities by Techniek 
-       Option to visit LRU repair license holder for unfamiliar/interesting failures 
 
 
“MATLOGCO has the freedom to keep contact with KMW and VHSP. There are two subjects for 
communication. First there is an exchange of technical information and secondly about formal 
contractual issues. There is a freedom to underkeep contacts within these subjects.” (Major W.H. 
Nieboer, MATLOGCO, Contractmanager) 
 
“By consulting a bright understanding and transparency of information sharing occurs.” (Major W.H. 
Nieboer, MATLOGCO, Contractmanager) 
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“Technical knowledge (Intellectual Property of the SystemOEM) is not unknown to KMW. KMW is 
more aware of the systems as NLD MoD is.” (Major Ir. R.H.J. Ceuleers, MATLOGCO, Clustermanager) 
Different kinds of subject are arranged in contracts, but the most important results are achieved by 
the member interaction within the organizational relationship. (Major Ir. R.H.J. Ceuleers, MATLOGCO, 
Clustermanager) 
 
4.4.2 Evaluation of the proposition 
Between the partners there is a common understanding of the importance of overt relationships. 
The specific characteristics of the branch and its limited members and temporary formations creates 
a necessity to have harmonious relationships. Overt information sharing will contribute to this. 
Despite this transparency, NLD MoD uses the TLD and ADR as control tools. Although these tools are 
available, they are only used if necessary. This research did not make clear if there are control tools 
used by KMW and VHSP. Although there is some empirical evidence the findings are to marginal to 
support the proposition.  
 
 
4.5 P4: Resultant power and the individual power of the players 
 
4.5.1 Resultant power  
MATLOGCO defined in the Business Case Motorenproefstand (MATLOGCO, 2014) the need for 
knowledge as “Knowledge is Power”. It is important for MATLOGCO to have the possession of 
knowledge and capacities to be a mature partner in the monopolistic branch of the Defence-industry. 
Thereby it is important to have a “fallback”. If MATLOGCO has enough knowledge it is possible to:  
- Measure and testing of suggested changes.  
- Estimating costs of suggested changes   
- Taking over production of certain elements if necessary  
- Acting as a mature mutual partner.  
If MATLOGCO has the necessary knowledge this will gain a positive effect on the cooperation with 
the partners.   
 
Between the three organizations there is not a common goal. For KMW and VHSP the main objective  
is making profit and for MATLOGO there is an importance for the sustainment of all land based 
systems to support users to execute operational tasks. Although there is not a common goal between 
the three organizations, knowledge is the binding element between them. By sharing knowledge all 
organizations in the triad will gain a better position. Especially VHSP will be able to create a better 
market position. The increase of knowledge on the site of MATLOGCO is in the benefit of KMW as 
well. As stated in Business Case Motorenproefstand (MATLOGCO, 2014) MATLOGCO wants to 
become a “smart maintainer” and “smart buyer”. By increasing the level of knowledge MATLOGCO 
becomes a more mature partner to KMW. This enables the relation to become more efficient and 
effective. MATLOGCO will be able to make its demands clearer to KMW and will be aware of the 
possibilities and restraints in the branch. Further, the input of MATLOGCO on the performance 
during operations is in the benefit of KMW. The qualitative increase of knowledge of MATLOGCO will 
lead to better information on performances of the systems. This information can be used by KMW 
for future system updates, which are in the end in the benefit of the NLD MoD. So, sharing 
knowledge might lead to optimizing systems and has a positive effect on the performance during 
(military) operations which is in the benefit of the NLD MoD. 
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MATLOGCO and VHSP are aware of the necessity of increasing the level of knowledge. It is 
questionable if KMW has the same intention. Although they will gain a better position, they don’t 
have an active policy in the coalition. They are aware of the wish of MATLOGCO and VHSP and is 
allowing an intensified cooperation. The willingness to form a coalition also depends of the kind of 
organization. To make a comparison, MATLOGCO should deal with (for example) a German 
SystemOEM who is not willing to form a coalition with a third player in the Netherlands and an 
Australian SystemOEM who accepts it as a normal business proces to introduce a third (Netherlands-
based) company. 
 
 “By the cooperation in the triad a better product will be created. The (operational) performance of 
the systems will increase, which is in the benefit of the NLD MoD. For VHSP and KMW there is a 
chance to enhance its market position by a more coupled intensive cooperation in the processes and 
of the performance of the LRU’s in the systems as well. Additional benefit of the intensive cooperation 
is a quick increase of the level of knowledge for all organizations within the triad.” (Major W.H. 
Nieboer, MATLOGCO, Contractmanager) 
 
 “Exchange of technical experience is very important for VHSP.  VHSP has an interes on how the 
systems perform during operational use under all kind of conditions. These conditions are not 
comparable with normal conditions and have a direct impact on the sustainment of the systems. 
Therefore, VHSP has a need for information to optimize the systems together with the SystemOEM”.  
(Mr. P. van den Bergh, VHSP, Accountmanager) 
 
“MATLOGCO and VHSP have a very strong wish to form a coalition. For KMW there is no necessity, 
although they don’t see it as a direct threat. This depends per organization, as an example for an 
Australian SystemOEM it is common to use a third player in the Netherlands, while a German 
SystemOEM not want to cooperate with a third player. This implicates comprehensive differences 
between the SystemOEM’s which are based on type of company, size, culture, etc.” (Major Ir. R.H.J. 
Ceuleers, MATLOGCO, Clustermanager) 
 
4.5.2 Evaluation of the proposition 
The NLD MoD is highly dependent on the knowledge which is possessed by KMW and VHSP. The 
sharing of information and knowledge will lead to a better performance of the systems. Therefore it 
is in the benefit of all organizations to invest in close cooperations within the triad. In the end this 
will lead to strengthening the triad and creates a stonger position then KMW would have on its own.  
The initiative between MATLOGCO and VHSP of the MRO Powerpack is a good example and should 
lead to more integration within the triad. The goal of MATLOGCO is to become a “smart maintainer” 
and “smart buyer”. By doing this they will become a more mature partner to KMW and the 
information exchange between MATLOGCO and KMW will be of higher quality and will be in the 
benefit of KMW as well. The cooperation between MATLOGCO and VHSP also creates a stronger 
position of these two organizations within the triad against the dominance of KMW. There is 
sufficient empiric evidence to support the proposition. 
 
 
4.6 P5: Coalition building is based on existing links between the players 
 
4.6.1 Existing links 
Since many years there is a link between KMW and the NLD MoD. Some systems are used for more 
than 30 years, so the relationship has existed for quite some time. In this branche these are very 
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common lengths in time, for comparable SystemOEM’s NLD MoD has the same long-lasting relations. 
As stated in HANDBOEK ONTWERP EN ONTWIKKELING (MATLOGCO, 2014) MATLOGCO is responsible 
for the complete product-life-cycle. This implies long-lasting formalized relationships with the 
suppliers. Since the MATLOGCO became aware of the license of VHSP in The Netherlands VHSP 
became involved. To shorten the turnaround time, reducing the number of spareparts VHSP became 
the maintainer of certain LRU’s of the KMW-family. So KMW was the contractor and VHSP would 
physically maintain the LRU’s. For this construction MATLOGCO had to pay a fee to KMW. Now the 
organizations in the triad become more aware of the importance of investing in nonformalized 
relationships.  
 
“On behave of MATLOGCO VHSP, as a licensee of KMW, became a more important player. In the past 
LRU’s were send to KMW and they send them to other companies in Germany. By recognizing the 
licensees, MATLOGCO demanded that VHSP should do de maintenance of the LRU’s.” (Major W.H. 
Nieboer, MATLOGCO, Contractmanager) 
 
“The cooperation exists for about 20 years.” (Major Ir. R.H.J. Ceuleers, MATLOGCO, Clustermanager) 
 
4.6.2 Evaluation of the proposition 
Between the NLD MoD and KMW there is a long-lasting relationship. The reason for this is not based 
on good mutual relations, which there certainly are, but on specific characteristics of the branch.  
The NLD MoD had a relationship with VHSP and its predecessors, recently the cooperation is getting 
intensified. There is sufficient empiric evidence to support the proposition. 
 
 
4.7 P6: The weakness of a buyer adds to his attractiveness  
 
4.7.1 Attractiveness of MATLOGCO as a weaker buyer  
The attractiveness of the NLD MoD is not because of its resources but the long-lasting engagements 
creating a certainty for KMW and VHSP with a certain amount of orders. By intesified integration of 
the operations the mutual dependence increases. For KMW there is not a direct necessity to form a 
coalition with the NLD MoD. KMW is a powerful player and the NLD MoD is a relative small buyer of 
the KMW-family. Although there is not a necessity, they are both unwilling to form a coalition. For 
KMW there is a benefit because personnel of MATLOGO is not only focused on the execution of the 
contracts but also is willing to find means for optimizing the cooperation and processes and provide 
new ideas. An important part of the turnover is generated by orders of the NLD MoD. So VHSP has a 
large dependence on NLD MoD. During missions the systems are operated under extreme conditions 
not comparable with the conditions in The Netherlands. Therefore the exchange of technical 
experience of these systems during operations is very important for optimizing the systems. With 
this technical experience, the position of VHSP increases. The importance of a coalition to VHSP is 
made clear in the wish to create a strategic cooperation between VHSP and MATLOGCO formalized in 
the MRO Power pack. By doing this the processes between MATLOGCO and VHSP become highly 
integrated and increases the mutual interdependence.  
 
“The relation of NLD MoD with KMW and VHSP guarantees a certainty for KMW and VHSP. By further 
integration of the cooperation the mutual interdependence increases and will create a certainty in 
orders. The NLD MoD is not attractive to KMW and VHSP because of its resources, but by its 
interdependence and potentiality of integration. This might lead to a certainty in orders and 
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possibility of better forecasting.” (Major N.G.W. van Schip, MATLOGCO, Stafofficier Toegevoegd & 
Externe Contacten) 
 
 “For KMW there is no necessity to form a coalition with the NLD MoD. The opposite is true for VHSP, 
in their existence they are highly dependent on orders from the NLD MoD.” (Major Ir. R.H.J. Ceuleers, 
MATLOGCO, Clustermanager) 
 
“To KMW it is pleasant that MATLOGCO is willing to cooperate in ideas for optimizing and creating 
new possibilities.” (Mr. R.J. Harbers, MATLOGCO, Contractmanager) 
 
4.7.2 Alternatives for MATLOGCO as the weaker buyer 
The contracts between KMW and MATLOGCO last between four and six years and cannot be 
abandoned before the end of the period. During this period, there are no alternatives for 
MATLOGCO. After this period, there are possibilities for MATLOGCO to abandon the relation with 
KMW. MATLOGCO uses this possibility in a limited number of cases, for example lamps for systems 
or metal shelves in vehicles. The reason for the limited use of this possibility has several reasons. The 
first reason is that KMW is responsible for the configuration of the systems. By contracting another 
supplier, the systems originally bought from KMW will have no more configurations and this will have 
an impact on the performance of the system. Another important reason is that by leaving KMW 
MATLOGCO will have the responsibility to arrange and manage all the contracts. In the first place this 
will give an intensification of the workload, because there are many sub suppliers, which now are 
managed by KMW. As mentioned earlier the personal capacity of MATLOGCO will not fit in quantity 
and quality to manage all these sub suppliers. The third reason why leaving KMW is not rational is 
close related to the second reason. As mentioned there are many sub suppliers. MATLOGCO has to 
cooperate with all these sub suppliers. Mostly MATLOGCO is a very small player and has a major 
negative effect of the power influence of MATLOGCO on these suppliers. Starting a direct 
relationship with the sub suppliers and bypassing KMW makes it necessary to create new procedures 
and working arrangements. This might have a negative effect on the performance of the systems. In 
the “Verslag LRU-herstel” (MATLOGCO, 2016) the managing board of MATLOGCO has emphasized it 
is preferable to use one contracted (commercial) supplier and preferable to use licensees of the 
SystemOEMS in the Netherlands for the physical maintenance activities.  
 
 “The relation with KMW has to be continued because KMW is responsible for the configuration of the 
systems.” (Major W.H. Nieboer, MATLOGCO, Contractmanager) 
“No, contracts must be complied until the end of contract and last four until six years. Subsequently, 
another supplier can be contracted, although it is doubtful if this is rational. This causes a split up in 
multiple contracts and is not preferable. It will make NLD MoD a very small player and limited to put 
influence on the supplier. This is identified by the managing board of MATLOGCO and stresses the 
necessity of using only one supplier.” (Mr. R.J. Harbers, MATLOGCO, Contractmanager) 
 
“Articles directly related to the system will purchased from the SystemOEM. For smaller articles, there 
is a possibility to arrange contracts with other suppliers.” (Major Ir. R.H.J. Ceuleers, MATLOGCO, 
Clustermanager) 
 
 “Transferring would lead to developing new arrangements and new procedures. In the first instance 
this will decrease the performance.” (Major N.G.W. van Schip, MATLOGCO, Stafofficier Toegevoegd & 
Externe Contacten) 
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4.7.3 Evaluation of the proposition 
For KMW there is no necessity to form a coalition with the NLD MoD because of certain resources. 
The attractiveness of the NLD MoD as a weaker buyer is in the perspective of long-term relationships. 
By integrating the relationships, the interdependence of the NLD MoD on KMW increases, which 
generate a certain amount of orders. On the other hand, the NLD MoD is a very small player for 
KMW. It is questionable if losing the NLD MoD as a customer would have severe influence on KMW. 
The opposite is true for VHSP. They have a highly dependence on NLD MoD. This is stressed by the 
wish to integrate processes in the MRO Power pack. So, for KMW the weakness of NLD MoD is not 
appealing for KMW but for VHSP it has a certain benefit. 
 
There are alternatives for MATLOGCO to bypass KMW but these are not very agreeable and in 
certain cases even impossible. Therefore MATLOGCO wants to continue the relationship with KMW 
and VHSP. There is sufficient empiric evidence to support the proposition. 
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5 Conclusions, discussion and recommendations 
 
In this final chapter, the conclusions, discussion of the most important findings and 
recommendations for practioners and future research are presented. In section 5.1 a summary of the 
motivation for this research is given. Secondly, the main conclusions to answer the overall problem 
statement will be presented. In section 5.2 the empirical findings will be reflected with the used 
literature.  Section 5.3 will focus on the practical implications of this research. The findings will be 
converted in practical implications for professionals who should optimize relationships within buyer-
supplier-supplier triads. The last section will give recommendations for further research and consist 
of two parts. First, the limitations of this research will be discussed. Secondly, recommendations will 
be done for further research based on the new ideas and suggestions of this research.  
 
 
5.1 Conclusions  
 
Power and interdependence are important concepts of buyer-supplier relationships and strongly 
influence the nature of the relationship. Buyer-supplier relationships that are characterized by 
asymmetric interdependence are believed to be deficient because the independent partner 
experiences high power and might be attempted to exploit it. A triad is the smallest unit of a network 
and consist of three actors and the links between them. The knowledge of coalition dynamics on the 
triadic level is fundamental to understand the level of larger networks. In this triadic context, the 
buyer can be the weaker player and two firms might form a coalition to gain leverage over the buying 
firm. Therefore, buyers should look for a coalition partner based on a temporary, means-oriented 
alliance with different goals in the same tier or linked tiers. To understand the process of larger 
networks it is important to understand the process of coalition building on a triadic level from the 
perspective of the weaker buyer. The problem statement of this study is: 
 
 “How are coalitions built in buyer-supplier networks from the perspective of a weaker buyer on a 
triadic level?” 
 
This research has led to some interesting findings. On behalf of MATLOGCO VHSP was introduced in 
the dyadic relation between MATLOGCO and KMW. By introducing VHSP into the relation several 
positive effects were met for especially MATLOGCO as the weaker buyer. Most important, 
knowledge could increase and the availability of operational systems would increase as well. The 
binding element within the triad between KMW-VHSP-MATLOGCO is knowledge. First, the exchange 
of knowledge will lead to optimizing the systems which are in use by the NLD MoD. The exchange of 
information between KMW and VHSP as the suppliers will lead to a better performance of the 
systems and is directly in the benefit for the NLD MoD, because they will be able to increase the 
performance on military operations. Secondly, by increasing the knowledge MATLOGCO will become 
a mature partner. As the user, they will be able to support VHSP and KMW which is in the benefit of 
optimizing existing systems and in the development of future systems and directly influences their 
market position towards their competitors. Especially VHSP and MATLOGCO are aware of the 
importance of knowledge and they have a special interest in starting a coalition.  The awareness of 
MATLOGCO being the weaker buyer and the strong interdependence of VHSP on knowledge resulted 
to an intensified exchange of knowledge and as a first result the Taskforce MRO Power Pack was 
formalized.  
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KMW and VHSP have shifting roles from buyer, supplier or partner between both organizations and 
in their network as well. Therefore there is a need for them to keep open and overt relations as a 
result the exchange of information is open and the forms of control are limited. Logically, they 
perform identical in their relationship with MATLOGCO. Another interesting result is found in the 
power domination. Although KMW is the absolute dominant organization within the triad it does not 
coerce its power. KMW is in certain cases a monopolistic player and therefore MATLOGCO cannot 
leave KMW as a supplier. On the other hand, the mutual interdependence is high, coercing power 
might influence the relations for future projects. The systems are in use for many years and this 
implies long-lasting relationships. Harmonious relationships among members are therefore beneficial 
to all of the involved organizations. An interesting result was the voluntary dependence of 
MATLOGCO on KMW. In some cases MATLOGCO is able to execute the contracts without KMW, but 
they prefer being serviced by KMW. 
 
 
5.2 Discussion 
 
The way suppliers work with each other (e.g., supplier–supplier relationships) has strategic 
importance to the buying firms (Choi et al., 2002; Lazzarini et al., 2008) One salient characteristic of 
supplier–supplier relationships is that these suppliers compete and collaborate at the same time. 
Recent supply management studies call such dynamics co-opetition (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 
1996; Davis, 1993).  The relationship between suppliers cannot been considered without considering 
the interaction between the buyer and each of the suppliers (Choi & Wu, 2009a). How suppliers 
interact with one another would affect the operational performance of the buyer (Wu and Choi, 
2010). Interaction between KMW and VHSP is an ongoing process. The most important element is in 
the development of new systems, in this phase there is a close cooperation between the suppliers. 
With increasing external integration, relationships with suppliers and customers become strategic 
and embody mutual support and cooperation, from product design through manufacturing to 
distribution (Clark, 1996; Frohlich & Westbrook, 2001; Hayes, 2002; Narasimhan & Jayaram, 1998; 
Parker & Anderson, 2002; Wheelwright & Bowen, 1996). In the development of the systems there is 
an intensive exchange of knowledge and information between the involved parties. In the Defence 
industry close cooperation between suppliers in the development of systems is common. The 
interaction between KMW and VHSP will lead to well equipped systems and will directly contribute 
to the performance of the NLD MoD in conducting military operations. This concludes that 
interaction of suppliers in a triadic relationship affects the operational performance of the buyer.  
 
For coalition building in a buyer-supplier context one of the assumptions is that a more powerful 
player in the triad can and will coerce its power over the weaker player in the triad (Caplow, 1956) 
and the possession of resources can determine the player’s power (Bast et al, 2013). KMW is having 
the possession of certain resources based on knowledge and experience which are elementary for 
MATLOGCO and VHSP. There is no pro-active attitude of KMW in coercing its power although it is 
obvious that KMW is the dominant power. MATLOGCO and VHSP cannot and will not cooperate 
without KMW. Although there are some benefits for leaving KMW, the disadvantages will be much 
greater. This clarifies why there is no need for KMW to coerce its power and is contrasting to Caplow 
(1956) who stated that a more powerful player in the triad can and will coerce its power over the 
weaker player in the triad.  
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Opportunities for coalition formation depend on the possibility of member interaction, which in turn 
is facilitated by the freedom of movement of potential participants. Bacharach and Lawler (1980) 
argued that coalition mobilization is more difficult when communication among potential 
participants is infrequent. In this specific case, there was enough freedom of movement between the 
participants. Within the triad, the transfer of information is overt, open and free. Business relations 
within the defence-industry are long-lasting, therefore all organizations are aware of the importance 
of harmonious relationships. The members have the common understanding of sharing information 
and being transparant towards eachother.  Furthermore, Bacharach and Lawler (1980) argued that 
players are trying to control each other. Although there are some control tools there is no empiric 
evidence that control is structural applied by one of the organizations. The reason can be found in 
the characteristics of the branch. First, the branch is very limited and secondly between the partners 
there are shifting roles from buyer, supplier and partner. Therefore transparency is elementary and 
common in the branch and makes control less important. The open and overt flow of information 
between the organizations and the limited number of control tools suggests that there is no support 
for the theory of Bacharach and Lawler (1980). There is a link to Caplow (1956) who stated that “a 
more powerful player in the triad can and will coerce its power over the weaker player in the triad ” 
(P2). Interestingly there is no support found for this theory and can be referred to the branch. 
 
Knowledge is the binding element within the triad. The intensive cooperation within the triad will 
increase the level of knowledge for all  organizations and will give them a better position. By the 
cooperation in the triad the (operational) performance of the systems will increase, which is in the 
benefit of the NLD MoD. For VHSP and KMW it is creating a chance to enhance its market position by 
a more coupled intensive cooperation in the processes and of the performance of the LRU’s in the 
systems as well. Bast et al. (2013) concluded that the resultant power from the coalition must be 
greater than that of the dominant player. Otherwise, the new coalition does not make sense. The 
increase of exchange of knowledge will lead to better information on performances of the systems 
during operations. KMW and VHSP have a mutual interest for information to optimize the systems 
together. Therefore, it is relevant to develop MATLOGCO as a mature partner who can support both 
suppliers with relevant information. This information can be used for system updates, which are in 
the end in the benefit of the NLD MoD. Interaction of KMW and VHSP in the triadic relationship 
affects the operational performance of MATLOGCO (P1), but also affects the performance of the 
triad in total. This implicates that P1 and P4 are related. 
 
Bastl et al. (2013) stated that potential coalition partners will influence the mutual interest for 
coalition formation. A mutual interest for coalition formation between two players will be stronger in 
situations where none of the alliance players can individually overpower the third player in a triad. 
MATLOGCO and VHSP have a very strong wish to form a coalition and this has been formalized in the 
Letter of Intent for an integrated cooperation. For KMW there is no necessity, although they don’t 
sense it as a direct threat. The resultant power will increase by intensifying on the sharing of 
knowledge. The theory of Bastl et al. (2013) is valid. Specifically there is a necessity for MATLOGCO 
and VHSP. There are benefits for KMW as well, however because of their dominance they do not 
have the same attitude. They do not coerce their power to MATLOGCO and VHSP. Therefore, can be 
concluded that in certain cases a dominant player in a triad will allow the other players the possibility 
to improve their positions. 
 
One of the assumptions of coalition theory (Caplow, 1956) is the existence of links between triadic 
players. At the organizational level this implies the existence of relationships between buyers and 
suppliers. Relationships between buyers and suppliers can occur in different types, such as 
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transactional, relational (Cannon & Perreault, 1999; Zsidisin & Ellram, 2001), formalized (Rossetti & 
Choi, 2005) and nonformalized (Gil, 2009). Since many years there is a link between KMW and the 
NLD MoD. Some systems are used for more than 30 years, so the relations existed for a long period 
of time. In this branch those long-lasting relationships are very common. Until recently this relation 
was formalized by contracts. VHSP was introduced in the relationship between KMW and 
MATLOGCO on behalf of MATLOGCO. This introduction had several benefits especially for 
MATLOGCO. Now the organizations in the triad become more aware of the importance of investing 
in nonformalized relationships. The characteristics of the branch are of importance for the existing 
links. Because of the limited number of organizations and the shifting roles in which transparency is 
elementary it is very important to invest in the nonformalized relations. There is a link with the 
theory of Bacharach and Lawler (1980) who argued that opportunities for coalition formation depend 
on the possibility of member interaction, which in turn is facilitated by the freedom of movement of 
potential participants. This implies that there is a link between “coalition building in a buyer-supplier 
context is based on already existing links” (P5) and “power asymmetry and a more powerful player 
that will coerce its power over weaker players” (P2). 
 
Power imbalance does not always lead to difficulties in a buyer-supplier relationship. It can be very 
effective to use power as coordination of exchange relationships as the distribution of powe r 
becomes legitimate over time (Maloni & Benton, 2000). The actors will focus on investing in 
developing strong long-term partnerships based on their individual and/or joint motivations (e.g. 
entering new markets) (Akpinar & Zettinig, 2008) or developing new products based on joint 
research (Anderson et al., 1994). The appeal of the NLD MoD is based on the possibility of long-
lasting engagements creating a certainty for KMW and VHSP with a certain amount of orders. By 
further integrating the operations the mutual dependence increases. VHSP has a large dependence 
on NLD MoD. The exchange of technical experience with regard to these systems during operations is 
very important to optimize the systems. With this technical experience, the position of VHSP 
increases. The importance of a coalition to VHSP is made clear in the wish to create a strategic 
cooperation between VHSP and MATLOGCO for the MRO Power pack. As a result the processes 
between MATLOGCO and VHSP become highly integrated and increases the mutual 
interdependence. Bast et al. (2013) concluded that the resultant power from the coalition must be 
greater than the dominant player on his own. Otherwise, the new coalition does not make sense. 
There is a mutual interdependence between VHSP and MATLOGCO. Both are dependent on KMW 
and to improve their position towards KMW they coalesce, which in the end is in the benefit of the 
triad. This implies that there is a relation between “the attractiveness of the weaker buyer for 
stronger suppliers to form a coalition” (P6) and “the resultant power of a coalition in a buyer-supplier 
context must be greater than the sum of the individual power of the players” (P4). 
 
Power and interdependence are related elements and they are generally considered important for 
the understanding of buyer–supplier relationships (e.g. Cox, 2001; Frazier & Antia, 1995).  In 
asymmetric relationships, the most independent partner dominates the exchange. For a buyer who is 
strongly dependent on a supplier this means vulnerability (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007). Therefore, 
they should consider if there are sufficient benefits attached to the relationship to offset the obvious 
disadvantages of such a vulnerable and dependent position towards a supplier. The contracts 
between KMW and MATLOGCO last between four and six years and cannot be abandoned before the 
end of the contract. During this period, there are no alternatives for MATLOGCO. After this period, 
there are possibilities for MATLOGCO to abandon the relation with KMW. MATLOGCO uses this 
possibility in a limited number of cases and these are primary articles which are not rare. Although 
there are some possibilities, KMW will in certain cases have a monopolistic position. Caniëls & 
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Gelderman (2007) do not take in consideration that it might be impossible to look for another 
supplier. Another interesting aspect is that it is a voluntary choice of MATLOGCO to be dependent on 
the more powerful supplier. If this is a known phenomenon within buyer-supplier relationships is not 
in the scope of this research. 
 
 
5.3 Recommendations for practioners 
 
Bastl et al. (2013) contributed to the body of knowledge on relational dynamics by focusing on the 
role of a weaker actor in a triadic context. They conclude that the knowledge of coalition dynamics 
on the triadic level is fundamental to understand the level of larger networks. This study contributed 
to describe a case study within the military-civil industry. In this case, the MATLOGCO was in the 
position of the weaker buyer. The defence-industry is characterized by a limited number of 
organizations and a high degree of integration. Like the NLD MoD the Western defence organizations 
have the same mutual interdependence to the civil supplier. Especially most of the European NATO-
partners are in the same position as the NLD MoD. The coalition established by MATLOGCO as a 
weaker buyer with especially VHSP and KMW can be in the benefit of other defence organizations as 
well. This study can contribute to these organizations as well and enable them to optimize their 
process to improve the military operations of their MoD in total.  
 
This study also contributes directly to the performance of MATLOGCO and VHSP. The results suggest 
that knowledge is the binding element. MATLOGCO wants to invest on becoming a “smart 
maintainer” and “smart buyer”. If MATLOGCO wants to be a mature partner to its suppliers it is 
necessary to increase the level of knowledge. By increasing the level of knowledge their position 
toward KMW as the dominant organization in the triad will change in the benefit of MATLOGCO and 
VHSP. By doing this the relation becomes more efficient and effective. MATLOGCO as an experienced 
customer is in the benefit of KMW. MATLOGCO will be more adept to make its demands clear to 
KMW and more aware of the possibilities and restraints in the branch. The qualitative increase of 
knowledge by MATLOGCO will lead to better information on performances of the systems during 
operations. Therefore, VHSP has a need for information to optimize the systems together with the 
SystemOEM. This information can be used as well by KMW for future system updates, which will 
benefit the NLD MoD in the end. For MATLOGCO and VHSP this study can be used as a theoretic 
confirmation that the started integration which is formalized in the Letter of Intent can be extended.  
 
 
5.4 Recommendations for further research 
 
There are two important limitations of this research and are opportunities for additional research. 
First, there is the risk of bias during the interviews and analyzing the outcomes of the interviews. The 
researcher is well experienced within the NLD MoD, but not in this specific branch and this causes a 
risk of wrong interpretations of the outcomes of the interviews. Further research can contribute to 
the validity by using an experienced individual within the branch as the researcher of this topic. The 
second limitation refers to the population of respondents. The respondents received the generally 
formulated interview questions in advance. The preparation time and the generalizability of the 
questions could not prevent personal opinions and personal assumptions as the result of the 
interviews. In some cases, this became clear during the interviews and the respondents were 
corrected with additional questions. In other cases, personal opinions or assumptions became clear 
whilst comparing the outcomes. Although the researcher has a focus on avoiding person prejudice by 
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the respondents it cannot be avoided that there are still elements of personal opinions and 
assumptions within the used data. This case study could not avoid this bias and pleads for further 
research in which the findings will be tested. 
 
One of the interesting results was that there was no need for KMW to proactively coerce its power. 
This is not in accordance to Caplow (1956) who stated that a more powerful player in the triad can 
and will coerce its power over the weaker player in the triad. Within the Defence-industry 
transparency between organization is elementary. There was a direct link with Bacharach and Lawler 
(1980) who stated that players are trying to control each other. The reason for this is because of the 
typical characteristics of the branch. These specific characteristics are also a limitation of the 
research. There is a possibility that keeping multiple case studies within triads in different branches 
will lead to other results. 
 
For a buyer who is strongly dependent on a supplier this means vulnerability. Caniëls & Gelderman 
(2007) suggested that a weaker buyer should consider if there are sufficient benefits attached to the 
relationship to offset the obvious disadvantages of such a vulnerable and dependent position 
towards a supplier. In some cases, a weaker buyer can abandon the relation with the supplier and 
focus on other suppliers. This is not optional if the supplier is a monopolist like partially was the case 
with KMW. Additional research of a triad with one (or two) monopolistic suppl iers can lead to 
interesting insights. 
 
The type of organization is also an important subject for an additional research. MATLOGCO is acting 
as a non-profit organization dealing with KMW and VHSP as profit organizations. This is an important 
difference. MATLOGCO is primary responsible to assure sustainment of all land based systems to 
support users to execute operational tasks. There is no primary need to focus on the profit aspects. 
Therefore researching a triad with only profit- or non-profit organizations can lead to other results. 
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Appendix A Overview of interviews 
Company Name  Position Interview 
date 
NLD 
MoD 
Major 
W.H. 
Nieboer  
NLD MoD/ 
Commando Landstrijdkrachten/ 
Materieel Logistiek Commando/ 
Afdeling Logistiek/ 
Assortimentsmanagement&Voorraadbeheer/ 
Cluster Gevechtsvoertuigen 
Contract 
manager 
20-02-
2017 
Major Ir. 
R.H.J. 
Ceuleers 
NLD MoD/ 
Commando Landstrijdkrachten/ 
Materieel Logistiek Commando/ 
Afdeling Logistiek/ 
Assortimentsmanagement&Voorraadbeheer/ 
Cluster Gevechtsvoertuigen 
Cluster 
manager 
07-03-
2017 
Major 
N.G.W. van 
Schip 
NLD MoD/ 
Commando Landstrijdkrachten/ 
Materieel Logistiek Commando/ 
Staf 
Stafofficier 
Toegevoegd & 
Externe 
Contacten 
08-03-
2017 
Mr R.J. 
Harbers 
NLD MoD/ 
Commando Landstrijdkrachten/ 
Materieel Logistiek Commando/ 
Afdeling Logistiek/ 
Verwerving 
Contract 
manager 
02-03-
2017 
Lieutenant-
Colonel 
C.M. 
Luteijn 
NLD MoD/ 
Commando Landstrijdkrachten/ 
Materieel Logistiek Commando/ 
Staf/ Accountmanagement 
Account 
manager 
13-03-
2017 
Mr. M. Bos NLD MoD/ 
Commando Landstrijdkrachten/ 
Materieel Logistiek Commando/ Afdeling 
Techniek/ Componentenherstel 
Hoofd Product 
eenheid 
Componenten 
herstel 
17-03-
2017 
Mr. Ing. 
R.A. 
Herruer 
NLD MoD/ Defensie Materieel 
Organisatie/Materieellogistiek/ 
Wapensystemen/Kennis & Innovatie/ 
Techniek 
Hoofd Bureau 
Techniek 
17-03-
2017 
Van 
Halteren 
Groep 
Mr. M. 
Werkman 
Van Halteren Special Products Account 
Manager 
10-03-
2017 
Mr. P. van 
den Bergh 
Van Halteren Special Products Account 
Manager 
10-03-
2017 
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Appendix B Interview guide 
 
Introductie 
-Voorstellen onderzoeker (naam, functie) en respondent (naam, functie, organisatie) 
-Bedanken voor medewerking 
-Reden en doel van het interview 
-Duur en inrichting gesprek (eerst algemene vragen en daarna inhoudelijk) 
-Benadrukken eigen mening is belangrijk, bestaan geen foute antwoorden 
-Vertrouwelijkheid gegevens 
-Gebruik opnamerecorder (alleen voor onderzoeksdoeleinden, respondent moet toestemming geven 
voor opname) 
 
Algemene vragen 
-Kunt u mij globaal uw organisatie beschrijven in strategie, doelstellingen, afzetmarkten, structuur, 
omvang, relaties, etc? 
-Kun u mij iets vertellen over uw huidige functie binnen uw organisatie? 
 
Open gestructureerd interview 
 
P1: “The interaction of suppliers in a tradic relationship affects the operational performance of the 
buyer.” 
 
Triad 
Een triad bestaat uit drie organisaties met drie dyadische (onderlinge) relaties.  
 
-Is er sprake van drie dyadische relaties (AB, AC, en BC) tussen Defensie (NLD MoD), Krauss-Maffei 
Wegmann GmbH & Co. KG (KMW) en Van Halteren Special Products (VHSP)? 
-Kunt u de positie van uw organisatie toelichten binnen de triadische relatie? 
 Wat is de taak van uw organisatie binnen de triad? 
-Kunt u de onderlinge relaties toelichten vanuit uw eigen organisatie? 
 Kunt u dit toelichten in formele beschrijvingen? 
 Kunt u dit toelichten in informele beschrijvingen? 
-Maakt de organisatie deel uit van een groter informeel network? 
 Welke bedrijven/organisaties hebben daarin een invloed op de triad? 
 Waaruit blijkt dit? 
 
Samenwerking 
Samenwerking tussen “suppliers” heeft invloed op de operational performance van de “buyer”. Door 
samenwerking te zoeken in probleemoplossing en besluitvorming worden de bedrijfsprocessen meer 
gekoppeld. Voorbeelden kunnen bijvoorbeeld worden gevonden in Research&Development. 
Tegelijkertijd zorgt samenwerking voor een toename van de ontwikkeling van kennis en draagt de 
onderlinge competitie bij aan de marktpositionering. 
 
-Is er sprake van een zekere samenwerking tussen KMW en VHSP? 
-Waaruit betaat deze samenwerking? 
-Welke effecten zijn er waar te nemen voor KMW en VHSP? 
 Zijn dit positieve of negatieve effecten? 
 Wat zijn concrete voorbeelden van die effecten? 
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-Is er sprake van een zekere concurrentie tussen KMW en VHSP? 
 Waaruit blijkt deze concurrentie? 
 Wat is de invloed hiervan op NLD MoD? 
-Heeft de interactie tussen KMW en VHSP invloed op de concurrentiepositie? 
 
Operational performance 
Operational performance refereert naar een zekere gerealiseerde competatieve sterkte van de 
organisatie. Er is een directe link tussen de mate van integratie in de keten en de operationele 
performance. Door intensief samen te werken m.b.t. operationele kennis en delen van informatie 
kan adequaat worden gereageerd op veranderingen in concurrentiepositie, technologie, 
omgevingsfactoren, etc.. Een hoge mate van integratie zal leiden tot volledige betrokkenheid van alle 
partijen van productdesign tot uitlevering. Bijkomend voordeel is dat er lagere kosten zullen zijn die 
uiteindelijk in het voordeel zijn van de “buyer”.  
 
-Wordt er (operationele) kennis en informatie gedeeld tussen de organisaties? 
 Om wat voor kennis en informatie gaat het? 
Is er een restrictie ivm operationele veiligheid of bedrijfsgeheimen? Hoe wordt met deze 
tekortkoming omgesprongen? 
-Heeft het delen van kennis en informatie geleid tot snel en efficiënt kunnen inspelen op 
veranderende omstandigheden? 
 Zijn hier voorbeelden van te benoemen? 
Was dit alleen van toepassing op bedrijfs-economische aspecten of ook (voor NLD MoD 
relevant) de gevechtskracht? 
-Heeft dit gevolgen voor de concurrentiepositie van KMW/VHSP? 
 Is dit te duiden in concrete cijfers? 
-Zijn NLD MoD, VHSP en KMW alledrie volledig betrokken bij de ontwikkeling tot en met de afstoting 
van het product? 
 Waaruit blijkt dit? 
 Is hiervoor een vastgesteld proces tussen de organisaties? 
 
P1: Invloed van de interractie tussen KMW en VHSP op de performance van NLD MoD 
-Wat is de invloed van de interactie tussen KMW en VHSP op de operational performance van NLD 
MoD? 
 Waaruit blijkt dit? 
 Zijn er concrete voorbeelden te benoemen? 
-Welke positieve en negatieve effecten van de interactie tussen KMW en VHSP zijn er waar te nemen 
op de operational performance van NLD MoD?  
 Waaruit blijkt dat? 
Hoe gaat NLD MoD hier mee om? 
Zijn er sturingsmogelijkheden voor NLD MoD? 
-Heeft integratie tussen KMW en VHSP geleid tot kostenverlaging voor NLD MoD? 
 Zijn deze bedragen aantoonbaar? 
 Hoe hoog zijn de bedragen? 
 Waarin zijn de kosten met name verlaagd? 
-Heeft integratie tussen KMW en VHSP geleid tot andere specifieke voordelen voor NLD MoD? 
Draagt dit direct bij aan de gevechtskracht van de Krijgsmacht en waaruit blijkt dat? 
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P2: “Coalition building in a buyer-supplier context requires power asymmetry and a more powerful 
play that will coerce its power over weaker players.” 
 
Coalitie 
Benoem de definitie van een coalitie; “An interacting group of individuals, deliberately constructed, 
independent of the formal structure, lacking its own internal formal structure, consisting of mutually 
perceived membership, issue oriented, focused on a goal or goals external to the coalition, and 
requiring concerted member action”. 
 
-Voldoet de samenwerking tussen KMW, VHSP en NLD MoD volgens u aan deze 8 criteria van een 
coalitie?  
-Kunt u een aantal specifieke herkenbare elementen toelichten op basis van ervaringen? 
-Wordt er bewust of onbewust invulling gegeven aan deze elementen? 
 
Middelen 
Het bezit van middelen bepaald de mate van macht en onafhankelijkheid. Deze moeten schaars, 
waardevol, onvervangbaar en moeilijk te imiteren zijn. Tegelijkertijd moeten organisaties activiteiten 
ontplooien die gespecialiseerd en uniek zijn om een competatief voordeel te behalen. Middelen 
kunnen worden onderverdeeld in personele- (opleidingsniveau, ervaring personeel, etc.), 
organisatorische- (intellectueel eigendom, relaties met andere ondernemingen, procedures, etc.) en 
fysieke middelen (toegang tot grondstoffen, toegang tot technologie, locatie, etc.).  
 
-Heeft KMW/VHSP bepaalde fysieke middelen die een voordeel opleveren? 
 Welke zijn dit? 
 Waarom leveren deze een voordeel op? 
-Heeft KMW/VHSP bepaalde personele middelen die een voordeel opleveren? 
 Welke zijn dit? 
 Waarom leveren deze een voordeel op? 
-Heeft KMW/ VHSP bepaalde organisatorische middelen die een voordeel opleveren? 
 Welke zijn dit? 
 Waarom leveren deze een voordeel op? 
-Kan NLD MoD hier specifieke middelen tegenover zetten voor de eigen machtspositionering? 
Welke zijn dit? 
Waaruit blijkt dat dit de eigen machtspositionering zal verbeteren? 
-Waarin onderscheid KMW/VHSP zich ten opzichte van brachegenoten?  
 Wat maakt de organisatie uniek en gespecialiseerd? 
-Wordt er gebruik gemaakt van het delen van elkaars middelen in de coalitie? 
 Welke middelen zijn dit? 
 Wordt dit structureel gedaan? 
 Zijn er afspraken over? 
-Maakt de organisatie gebruik van de positionering van de andere organisaties in de coalitie?  
 Op welke wijze? 
 Wordt dit structureel toegepast? 
 Is er een duidelijke doelstelling voor? 
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Macht 
Macht kan worden omschreven als: “Speler A oefent een bepaalde macht uit over speler B en laat 
deze dingen doen die hij normal niet zou doen”. Hier kan aan toe worden gevoegd: “Macht is het 
deel dat speler A uitoefent op speler B wat door speler B niet kan worden overwonnen”. Feitelijk is 
macht de mogelijkheid om personen en organisaties te beïnvloeden. In asymetrisch relaties 
domineert de meest onafhankelijke speler. Een dominante speler kan en zal zijn macht uitoefenen in 
een triadische relatie. 
 
-Op welke wijze oefent de eigen organisatie macht uit?  
 Worden er specifieke middelen, procedures of technieken ingezet? 
 Is dit onderdeel van een bepaald beleid? 
-Zijn er situaties te benoemen waarin er, op verzoek van andere organisaties, activiteiten worden 
ondernomen die de eigen organisatie normaal niet zou doen? 
 Is dit een veeal voorkomende situatie? 
 Vanuit welke organisatie wordt dit het meest toegepast? 
 Wordt er een actief beleid gevoerd om hierop aan te passen/voorkomen? 
 
P2: Machtsuitoefening in de coalitie 
-Worden bepaalde middelen ingezet om de positie van de eigen organisatie te versterken? 
 Wat zijn die middelen? 
 Hoe worden die middelen ingezet en wat is de doelstelling?  
-Is er een dominante speler binnen de coalitie te benoemen? 
 Waaruit blijkt de dominantie? 
 Wordt deze dominantie bewust ervaren door alle partijen in de coalitie? 
-Zijn er situaties te benoemen waarin er, op verzoek van een van de andere organisaties binnen de 
coalitie, activiteiten worden ondernomen die de eigen organisatie normaal niet zou doen? 
 Wat zijn die activiteiten? 
 Op welke schaal en hoe vaak heeft dit plaats? 
-In welke mate wordt er weerstand geboden tegen machtsuitoefening van de andere organisaties in 
de coalitie? 
 Hoe wordt hier vorm aan gegeven? 
 Heeft dit invloed op de onderlinge verhoudingen? 
 Heeft dit invloed op de gezamenlijke doelstellingen? 
 
 
P3: “Each player of a coalition in a buyer-supplier context will try to control the other players.” 
 
Contact en controle 
De mogelijkheid om een coalitie te vormen heeft te maken met een zekere vrijheid van individuen 
om onderling contacten te leggen en te handelen zonder onderlinge- en centrale eigen controle. 
 
-Hebben individuen van uw organisatie de mogelijkheid om contacten te leggen met individuen van 
de andere organisaties? 
Wat is de inhoudelijkheid van deze contacten?  
Hoe vaak wordt hier invulling aan gegeven? 
-Worden deze personen door de eigen organisatie gecontroleerd op hun handelen? Hoe krijgt dit 
vorm? 
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-Hoe wordt er invulling gegeven aan de vertrouwelijkheid m.b.t. informatie? 
 Wordt er rekening gehouden met de operationele veiligheid? 
 Is de vertrouwelijkheid van invloed op de prestaties van de coalitie? 
 
Initiatief 
Coalities bestaan uit individuen die elkaars steun zoeken en het eens zijn over een te verwachten 
uitkomst. De eerste stap in coalitievorming is genomen zodra organisatieleden een begin maken met 
het bespreken van specifieke onderwerpen. Uiteindelijk kan dit leiden tot een succesvolle coalitie die 
langdurig bestaat en leert van haar fouten. Anderzijds kan het leiden dat de coalitie geen succes is en 
op zal houden te bestaan. 
 
-Zijn er binnen de organisaties individuen geweest die het initiatief voor coalitievorming hebben 
genomen? 
Op welk niveau worden deze initiatieven genomen? 
Welke specifieke onderwerpen werden er besproken? 
Was er een bepaalde verwachte uitkomst? 
Tot welke successen heeft dit geleid? 
 
P3: Controle en invloed op andere organisaties in de coalitie  
-Voert uw organisatie een zekere mate van controle op de andere organisaties?  
Hoe wordt hier vorm aan gegeven? 
-Kan de organisatie de andere organisatie controleren op de omgang met vertrouwelijke informatie 
 Hoe wordt dit gedaan? 
 Zijn hier formele afspraken over? 
-Worden initiatieven van een van de organisaties gecontroleerd door de andere twee organisaties? 
 Is dit een bewust beleid? 
 Hoe wordt hier vorm aan gegeven? 
  
P4: “The resultant power of a coalition in a buyer-supplier context must be greater than the sum of 
the individual power of the players.” 
 
Resultant van macht 
Het resultant van de macht dat drie coalitiepartners samen kunnen uitbrengen moet groter zijn dan 
de individuele macht van de dominante partner. Het samenbrengen van unieke middelen kan een 
sterkere positie creeëren van de onderlinge organisaties.  
 
-Worden specifieke middelen gebundeld door de coalitiepartners? 
 Welke middelen zijn dit? 
 Is dit structureel of gebeurt dit incidenteel? 
 Is er een duidelijke en gezamenlijke doelstelling om deze middelen te bundelen? 
-Heeft dit voordelen voor de marktpositie van KMW en VHSP? 
 Wat zijn die concrete voordelen? 
-Welke voordelen heeft dit voor NLD MoD? 
 Wat zijn die concrete voordelen? 
-Is er een specifieke noodzaak voor NLD MoD te onderscheiden om middelen te bundelen met KMW 
en VHSP? 
 Waaruit ontstaat die noodzaak? 
 Welke specifieke middelen worden dan gebundeld? 
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 Hoe wordt dit afgestemd met KMW en VHSP? 
 
P4: Resultant groter dan de individuele macht van de dominante partner 
Is het resultant van de de macht van de drie coalitiepartners samen groter dan de individuele macht 
van de dominante partner? 
Zijn deze gezamenlijke middelen aantoonbaar sterker dan de macht van de dominante 
coalitie partner? 
Waaruit blijkt dat? 
Zijn er aantoonbare resultaten te benoemen? 
  
P5: “Coalition building in a buyer-supplier context is based on already existing links between the 
players.” 
 
Bestaande relaties 
Coalitievorming vindt altijd plaats binnen reeds bestaande relaties. Relaties kunnen verschillende 
verschrijningsvormen hebben. 
 
-Kunt u omschrijven hoe uw eerste relatie met de individuele organisaties zich heeft ontwikkeld? 
 Kunt u dit benoemen in tijd, omvang, formalisaties, etc.? 
-In welk opzicht verschilt de relatie nu ten opzichte van de beginfase? 
 Hoe omschrijft u uw relatie momenteel in formele zin? 
 Hoe omschrijft u uw relatie momenteel in informele zin? 
 Zijn doelstellingen formeel vastgelegd? 
 Zijn taken en verantwoordelijkheden formeel vastgelegd? 
 
P6: “The weakness of a buyer adds to his attractiveness for stronger suppliers to form a collation.” 
 
Aantrekkelijkheid zwakkere “buyer” 
Een machtsonbalans tussen organisaties hoeft niet tot problemen te leiden. Een zwakkere “buyer” 
kan specifieke middelen hebben die het uitermate zinvol maken voor de machtere organisatie om 
een coalitie te vormen. Hierbij kan worden gedacht aan specifieke kennis, contacten of positie. De 
partijen zullen dan focussen op de gezamenlijke motivaties. Hoewel er een gezamenlijke motivatie is, 
blijft de positie van de zwakkere organisatie kwetsbaar. Het is raadzaam voor de zwakkere “buyer” 
om permanent mogelijke alternatieven te onderzoeken. 
 
-Beschikt NLD MoD over specifieke middelen die het voor KMW en VHSP interessant maken om een 
langdurige relatie aan te gaan? 
 Wat zijn deze specifieke middelen? 
 Wat maken deze middelen zo interessant voor KMW en VHSP? 
Hoe worden deze specifieke middelen door NLD MoD ingezet binnen de coalitie? En is dit 
bewust beleid? 
-Zijn er voor NLD MoD alternatieven ten aanzien van leveranciers en wordt hier een actief beleid op 
gevoerd? 
 Wat zijn de alternatieven? 
 Hoe wordt invulling gegeven aan het beleid? 
-Heeft NLD MoD alternatieven om de macht van KMW en VHSP te beïnvloeden? 
 Wat zijn de alternatieven? 
 Wordt hier bewust beleid op gevoerd en hoe wordt dit toegepast? 
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P6: Aantrekkelijkheid om een coalitie te vormen met een zwakkere buyer 
-Kan de zwakte van NLD MoD worden gezien als positief voor KMW en VHSP om een coalitie te 
vormen? 
 Welke argumenten heeft KMW en VHSP hiervoor? 
-Zijn de specifieke middelen van NLD MoD de reden voor KMW en VHSP om een coalitie te vormen? 
-Zijn er andere argumenten voor KMW en VHSP, dan de specifieke middelen, om een coalitie te 
vormen? 
 Wat zijn deze argumenten? 
 Wat is het belangrjkste argument en geldt deze voor alle organisaties in de coalitie? 
-Is de mogelijkheid van overstappen naar een andere leverancier een argument voor KMW en VHSP 
om een coalitie met NLD MoD aan te gaan? 
 Wordt op dit risico een bewust beleid gevoerd door KMW/VHSP? 
 Wat is de consequentie van overstappen naar een andere leverancier voor alle partijen? 
 
Afsluiting  
-Aanvullende vragen of opmerkingen 
-Bedanken gesprek 
-Aangeven dat het interview zal worden uitgewerkt en de respondent het verslag toegestuurd zal 
krijgen ter controle op onjuistheden en onvolkomenheden en eventuele verduidelijking.  
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 Appendix C Organizational structure MATLOGCO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C-MatlogCo
Afd. 
Systemen & 
Analyse
Afd. 
Logistiek
Afd. 
Techniek
300 
Matlogcie
Staf 
MatlogCo
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Appendix D Overview documents 
 
Doc 
nr 
Author Name document Date 
01 MATLOGCO Programme of Requirements 02-03-2017 
02 Academie voor 
Overheidscommunicatie 
Hoe de Koninklijke Landmacht samen met 
de defensie-industrie werkt aan een 
wereldwijd inzetbare landmacht. 
04-2013 
03 MATLOGCO Business Case Motorenproefstand 27-05-2014 
04 MATLOGCO Competentiematrix 06-2015 
05 MATLOGCO, NOVEK Letter of Intent 16-04-2015 
06 Staf Commando 
Landstrijdkrachten 
Taskforce operationele MRO power packs 11-09-2015 
07 MATLOGCO/ Harbers Email Inventory 2-3-2017 
08 MATLOGCO Verslag LRU-herstel 11-10-2016 
09 MATLOGCO Handboek Ontwerp en Ontwikkeling 11-03-2014 
 
